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# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1661

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## MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

### WESTERN VIEWS OF SOVIET THREAT REFUTED

Col Gen N. Chervov on the 'Soviet Military Threat'

Moscow AGITATOR in Russian No 1, Jan 82 (signed to press 21 Dec 81) pp 26-29

[Article by Col Gen N. Chervov: "Who Benefits by the Myth of the 'Soviet Military Threat'?"]

[Text] The CPSU and Soviet state are performing consistent, intensive work to implement the Peace Program. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's visit to the FRG was a new contribution toward this. Step by step, the path is being cleared for a serious international dialog and for productive talks on burning problems of war and peace. Broad public and political circles abroad are perceiving more and more clearly that it is not preparation for war, but strengthening of the peace that is the thread leading to tomorrow.

By trampling on the fundamental interests of the peoples, aggressive forces of imperialism, especially American imperialism, together with the Maoists have set a course hostile to the cause of detente, a course toward working up the arms race and leading to stepped-up military danger. The bugaboo of the "Soviet military threat" serves as a screen concealing U.S. and NATO militaristic preparations and the aggressive actions and expansionism of American imperialism.

The myth of the "Soviet military threat" is not something new. This theme has been developed in the West from the first days of the Soviet state's origin. It is used as an ideological cover for the reactionary essence of the domestic and foreign policy of aggressive imperialist circles. V. I. Lenin wrote in 1919: "There are stupid people who shout about Red militarism; these are political swindlers who give the appearance of believing in this stupidity and cast similar accusations right and left, taking advantage of their lawyer's ability to concoct false arguments and throw sand in the masses' eyes for this purpose" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XXXVIII, 50).

The first act of the Soviet Republic was the Decree on Peace.

How did imperialist states respond to the Soviet call for peace? With aggression against the young socialist republic by united forces of states including the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan and others. Together with the internal counterrevolution, they hoped to "nip it in the bud," break it up and turn it into a colony of international imperialism. All this was concealed in the West by the hypocritical slogan of combating the "Red threat."

After World War II ended, when Soviet citizens were wholly engaged in rebuilding a national economy devastated by the war, imperialist circles of the West and the United States above all, again revived the myth of the "Soviet military threat" and under its cover fostered monstrous plans for atomic warfare against the USSR, their recent ally in the anti-Hitler coalition.

The answer to the question of who was threatening whom at that time is provided by now declassified official documents of the U.S. political and military leadership. They give direct evidence of U.S. preparations for an atomic war against the USSR. An atomic attack was being prepared against the USSR back in 1945 (Directive No 432/D) using 196 atomic bombs against 20 Soviet cities; then in 1948 (the "Charioteer" Plan) employing over 200 atomic bombs against 70 Soviet cities; in 1949 (the "Dropshot" Plan) employing 300 atomic bombs and 250,000 tons of conventional bombs for destroying up to 85 percent of the Soviet industry; and in 1950 (the "Trojan" Plan) using over 300 bombs against 100 Soviet cities. In 1952 U.S. President Truman twice examined the possibility of employing atomic weapons against the USSR.

According to data of the American Brookings Institution, in the period from 1956 through 1975 the United States resorted directly or indirectly to the use of armed forces or threatened other countries with military intervention over 200 times. The question of employing nuclear weapons was placed on the agenda in Washington almost 20 times, including four times when the threat was addressed directly at the USSR. All these are facts. They bare the inside aggressiveness of the U.S. military-political course.

Responding to questions from editors of the West German journal SPIEGEL, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev reaffirmed the peaceloving character of our foreign policy. He said: "The Soviet Union threatens no one, nor is it planning to attack anyone. And our military doctrine bears a defensive character."

At the present time fabrications about the "Soviet military threat" pursue concrete goals of justifying the arms race begun by imperialism, by placing the blame for it on the Soviet Union; of discrediting the USSR's foreign policy directed at a relaxation of international tension; and obtaining a pretext for using American Armed Forces in various parts of the world to put down national liberation movements.

In conformity with these goals bourgeois propaganda in the West presents the public with a mass of "information," figures and diagrams used to depict the USSR as the initiator of the arms race allegedly striving for military superiority, coveting foreign territories and riches, and fostering plans for preparing for nuclear war and the seizure of Europe and other countries.

But reality completely refutes all these conjectures. It is not the USSR, but the United States which unleashed rivalry in the field of mass destruction weapons back in 1945, when it was the first to make and employ atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The United States was the initiator of the race in arms of intercontinental range by creating an armada of strategic bombers in the 1950's. In the early 1960's it was the first to begin mass deployment

of intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, as well as strategic nuclear-powered submarines in the ocean. At the beginning of the 1970's Washington was the first to begin fitting intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles. It was the United States back in 1972 which began development of strategic cruise missiles and which now has begun to carry out plans to deploy thousands of such missiles in the air, on the land and at sea. The monstrous neutron weapon was invented abroad and now its widescale production is being unfolded.

One might ask just who is stimulating the arms race at the present time. The following data provide a very specific answer to this question: the level of U.S. military expenditures not justified by defense needs (over the next five years they will comprise \$1.5 trillion, i.e., almost as much as the Pentagon spent over the last 12 years); accelerated build-up in the combat capabilities of strategic nuclear forces, primarily by deployment of the MX ICBM, the "Tri-dent" SSBN's, new strategic bombers and cruise missiles with all kinds of basing in the 1980's; an attempt to deploy new medium range nuclear missiles in Western Europe no matter what; and a significant increase in combat might and strength of armed forces of the United States (by 250,000 by 1986) and the NATO bloc as a whole.

The feverish activity in building up arms is cloaked with conjectures about U.S. "military lag" behind the USSR and about the USSR's alleged advantage in strategic arms and medium range nuclear missiles, in connection with which a "window of vulnerability" allegedly is being created for the United States.

In reality of course there is neither a lag nor vulnerability. To the contrary, development of strategic nuclear weapons of the USSR and the United States in the period 1960-1981 took place in a way such that the USSR for a long while was "catching up" with the United States. A balance was established in the mid-1970's which the USSR did not and does not plan to disrupt. The relative strength of strategic nuclear forces was adjusted repeatedly in the process of drawing up the SALT-II Treaty. It was recognized that they are approximately equal: 2,500 delivery platforms on the one side and some 2,300 on the other; somewhat more warheads for the United States than the USSR; but on the whole, approximate equality.

On the day the Treaty was signed the U.S. president described it as a document which "represents a mutually acceptable balance of interests of both parties." An agreement was reached that when the SALT-II Treaty came into force each of the sides pledged to limit strategic arms to a sum total not exceeding 2,400 units initially, and 2,250 units as of 1 January 1981.

That was in 1979, but soon after the signing of the Treaty first Carter and then President Reagan began to state that there was no equality and that the USSR had moved far ahead in strategic arms and created a military threat for the United States. How can this be explained? Is it really conceivable to attain superiority in one or two years, let alone a substantial superiority in strategic arms, for which many years are spent in their creation? Or perhaps some kind of unexpected facts were uncovered which previously had not been considered? No, no new facts appeared.

U.S. and NATO leaders are deceiving the public when they state that the Soviet SS-20 missiles are disrupting the military balance. The truth is that for a number of years now the number of medium range nuclear weapons in Europe has remained approximately the same--some 1,000 units on each side. As applied to NATO we are speaking above all about U.S. forward based weapons--a total of over 700 units--and corresponding arms of U.S. allies in Europe--some 300 medium range platforms.

Can all these weapons really be ignored? Of course not, for these are not tactical nuclear weapons as NATO leaders try to depict them, but continental weapons. These weapons have ranges (radii) of action of from 1,000 to 4,500 km and are capable of reaching targets on USSR territory right up to the Urals.

For the USSR's part this grouping is opposed by the SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles and medium bombers. Their total number does not exceed the number of NATO's medium range platforms.

Then just why does the United States say that the USSR has superiority in medium range nuclear weapons? It is all a matter of the West consciously being silent about U.S. forward based nuclear weapons, giving the appearance that they do not exist and trying to compare the forces of the sides only based on ground based missiles. This approach, in which many hundreds of NATO medium range platforms are not considered by NATO, does not meet the principle of equal security.

There must be a comparison of the cumulative nuclear potentials of NATO and USSR medium range weapons. Such potentials of the sides in Europe now are approximately equal. This was mentioned, by the way, by FRG Chancellor H. Schmidt, U.S. Secretary of State A. Haig and other western leaders. Today for some reason they express other opinions in the face of facts, but the equality was not disrupted because of this.

NATO countries repeatedly modernized their medium range nuclear arms and are modernizing and building them up even now.

In England, for example, improved ballistic missiles are being placed aboard "Polaris" submarines with six instead of the present three warheads and in the 1990's there will be the "Trident" missiles with eight warheads.

In France ground and sea based missiles with single-charge re-entry vehicle will be replaced partially with missiles having seven warheads; and there will be seven submarines in the order of battle by 1990 in place of five submarines.

U.S. forward based weapons also are being renewed.

All this is considered quite natural. At the same time NATO leaders demand that the USSR give up modernization of its weapons and eliminate the SS-20 missiles and all medium range missile weapons in general. In fact this would signify unilateral disarmament of the Soviet Union.



There is no elementary realism in such a position by the West, the more so as in conducting modernization, i.e., replacing old missiles with new ones for purposes of preserving parity, the USSR not only is not increasing the total number of medium range weapons by a single unit, but even is decreasing it, since one or two old missiles are removed simultaneously with the deployment of each new SS-20 missile, with the old missiles being disassembled and not deployed in other areas. But speaking of the total number of the sides' nuclear warheads, the NATO command knows that even now their medium range weapons can carry  $1\frac{1}{2}$  times more warheads in one launch (sortie) than corresponding USSR weapons.

In case an additional 572 new American nuclear missiles are stationed in Europe the West will obtain a superiority of more than  $1\frac{1}{2}$  times over Warsaw Pact nations in medium range platforms, and NATO's advantage in nuclear warheads will rise even more. Equality of the sides' nuclear arms in Europe will be disrupted substantially in NATO's favor. In addition, the balance of the USSR's and U.S. strategic forces will be disrupted, since the new American missiles are strategic arms with respect to the Soviet Union. They can reach Soviet territory while our SS-20 missiles do not reach U.S. territory. This means that the "addition" of 572 missiles must be added to the American strategic arms potential.

Military danger will rise sharply for Europe with the deployment of the new medium range missiles, since West European countries will become even more dependent on Washington's nuclear strategy.

The malicious fraud about the Warsaw Pact's alleged significant superiority in conventional armed forces and creation of a so-called "tank threat" does not stand up to criticism. The facts indicate otherwise.

For example, according to information of the London Strategic Studies Institute ("Relative Strength of Armed Forces in 1981-1982"), the total strength of armed forces is (in thousands): 4,934 for NATO and 4,788 for the Warsaw Pact.

An exchange of figures at the Vienna talks (as of 1 January 1980) also confirms the presence of an approximate equality in the size of ground and air forces of the sides in Central Europe (991,000 for NATO and 979,000 for SVD [Warsaw Pact Nations]).

An approximate balance also exists between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in other indicators. As stated in the collection of the London Institute, a certain Warsaw Pact superiority in tanks is fully compensated by NATO superiority in antitank weapons. According to data of a full-scale study by the Carnegie Foundation, NATO has a twofold superiority over Warsaw Pact nations in ATGM launchers. At one time (in 1974) U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger noted in a report to the Congress: "Modern antitank weapons deployed in sufficient numbers make up for the superiority of Warsaw Pact nations in the number of tanks. In this regard we do not deem it necessary to have an equal number of tanks with the Soviet Union." This is the very way NATO strategists considered it necessary, by their own admissions, to assure "equality of combat capabilities" in this area.

It should be considered that although the Warsaw Pact actually has more tanks, NATO has many of them as well. U.S. and NATO leaders considerably downgrade the number of tanks they have (allegedly only some 1,200). As a matter of fact, there are over 16,000 tanks directly in troop units. In addition, there are some 1,500 American tanks and 6,500 tanks of West European countries of NATO stockpiled in Europe. Over 7,000 tanks are on the American continent (in the United States and Canada). In the next few years it is planned to deliver some 9,000 of the new model tanks (XM-1, Leopard-2 and Chieftain) to NATO forces.

Thus objective data indicate that in all cases, whether we take strategic nuclear arms or medium range nuclear weapons in Europe or conventional armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, there is an approximate equality between the sides. There is a balance. It does exist, and not on paper, but in reality.

Let us examine one other matter in the area of the "Soviet military threat." Voices are heard in the West saying that the USSR allegedly is increasing its military presence in the countries of Africa, Asia and the Near East. This does not conform to reality. Not counting the limited number of Soviet military specialists helping to master equipment and weapons delivered from the USSR, there has not been and is not a single Soviet soldier or single combat unit of Soviet troops in these areas. The USSR has not intervened nor is it intervening in the internal affairs of any other state.

With respect to Afghanistan, the United States and NATO have no moral or other right to question the Soviet Union's lawful assistance to the friendly Afghan people in repulsing aggression from without. Our country supports the well-known proposals of the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] government for achieving political settlement. The question of the limited Soviet military contingent located there also can be decided within the context of such a settlement, about which corresponding statements have been made repeatedly on the part of the Soviet Union.

Turning to the United States, their aggressive actions are familiar to the entire world. The military bases of American imperialism--strongpoints of aggression--have extended to all corners of the globe. There is a total of some 2,500 military bases and installations and over a half-million servicemen outside the United States. The United States has surrounded our country with a ring of military bases in which there are American troops and a large number of nuclear weapons. American warships and submarines with ballistic missiles are constantly plying the waters near Soviet borders. The USSR has not had nor does it have a single military base near U.S. territory. We may ask: Who is threatening whom in the given case?

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev says that "it is nothing more than an undignified technique of political struggle to ascribe to the Soviet Union any kind of crafty schemes in Europe, Africa or the Near East or with respect to the United States. This has nothing to do with the facts."

Certain responsible U.S. and NATO figures commit the crudest distortions with respect to the character of the Soviet Union's military doctrine. For example, in the Pentagon booklet entitled "The Soviet Military Power" as well as in a number of statements by Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger it is asserted that the USSR is fostering plans of a first nuclear strike in the calculation to win victory in war. It stands to reason that this is done not out of ignorance, but consciously in order to divert the public's attention from their militaristic doctrines and conceal their own intentions and plans for preparing for nuclear war.

The Pentagon now has "hawks" at the helm of the Armed Forces (such as Secretary of the Navy Lehman) who literally think in categories of war. They discuss with unconcerned ease the acceptability of a nuclear first strike and of nuclear warfare--large, small, limited, unlimited and so on. For example, Lehman flies into a bellicose rage and loses his sense of measure in calling for delivery of a surprise nuclear strike against the Soviet Union with strategic ground and sea based weapons under conditions when the United States should deem it necessary.

The Soviet Union resolutely condemns all talk about war and a preemptive strike. We are not preparing for armed attack against anyone. Soviet military doctrine bears a strictly defensive character. The USSR views nuclear attack as a most serious crime against mankind. Ascribing to us some kind of crafty schemes of preparing a "first strike" against the United States is deception of the world public. Responding to questions from editors of the journal SPIEGEL, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said: "The Soviet Union is in favor of not expanding the arsenals of all kinds of nuclear weapons in Europe and, vice versa, is in favor of beginning a process of their reduction. . . . It would be well if the West realized that peace and tranquility are needed by all states of Europe, and not just by countries of the socialist community."

Unfortunately the United States and certain NATO countries do not yet show serious interest in problems of vital importance for mankind. Instead of agreements on the basis of equality and equal security, they advance diktat and open confrontation; instead of eliminating centers of conflict through common efforts they advance the creation of more and more military bases and increased military presence in various parts of the world; instead of curbing the arms race they advance "additional armaments and creation of new and even more devastating means of mass destruction.

All this actually contradicts detente, whips up international tension and reinforces the threat that a war will break out. The source of military threat is American imperialism, which has not given up plans to return lost positions by military means and which fosters dangerous plans for military adventures. For this reason, while steadfastly conducting an active peaceloving foreign policy, the USSR cannot help but reckon with the threat which actually exists. It is forced to keep its defenses at the level of modern requirements and strengthen the Soviet Armed Forces as the shield of the peaceful labor of builders of communism and as one of the main factors for preventing a new world war.



Dictionary of Abbreviations:

BRPL: Ballistic missile-armed submarine.

MBR: Intercontinental ballistic missile.

PU PTUR: Antitank guided missile launcher.

SVD: Warsaw Pact member nations.

SS-20, SS-4, SS-5: Certain kinds of Soviet missiles according to NATO terminology.

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G. Vasil'yev Essay on 'The Threat to Peace'

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Jan 82 p 5

[Article by G. Vasil'yev: "The Source of the Threat to Peace"]

[Text] It is generally known what an important and "strategic," so to speak, role is played by the myth of the "Soviet military threat to the West" recently made much of in the general set of malicious fabrications of imperialist propaganda about the Soviet Union and its politics. A special place in this intensive campaign of misinformation was given to the Pentagon pamphlet "Soviet Military Power" published abroad last fall. Widely advertised by American mass media, it had the purpose of frightening the western public with the USSR's military potential and persuading it as to the need to agree to a further excitation of the arms race. The falsifiers were caught redhanded. It was learned that the Pentagon's pseudoscientific fraud was built on tendentiously collected data about the USSR's Armed Forces and contained absolutely no information about U.S. and NATO war machines.

But there is no stopping the sowers of fear. They continue to frighten people by a fictitious "Soviet military danger." Under these conditions the book "Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru" [The Source of the Threat to Peace],\* recently off the presses, acquires great importance. Based on data from competent Soviet agencies as well as certain facts and figures of the London Strategic Studies Institute and official American sources, it provides an opportunity of preparing the real facts and drawing objective conclusions as to the relative strength between the East and West and the general direction of foreign policy of the USSR and United States.

The book exposes the Pentagon falsifiers, who pretend to be a helpless "Red Riding Hood" faced by a fanged wolf. There was so much hullabaloo abroad concerning the "advantage" of Warsaw Pact nations (SVD) in total size of the

\*"Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru," USSR Ministry of Defense Voennoye izdatel'stvo, Moscow, 1982.

Armed Forces. But here are accurate data. Regular NATO forces number 4,933,000 and SVD forces number 4,788,000.

The book shows convincingly that the United States has been the pioneer of the arms race through all postwar decades. It was the United States which in 1945 was first to create the atomic bomb and use it without any military necessity; which in the 1950's-1960's was the initiator of the strategic arms race and which began building up the number of strategic nuclear-powered submarines; which at the beginning of the 1970's was first to begin fitting strategic ballistic missiles with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles; which right after this began creating long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles; and in 1981 it announced full-scale production of neutron weapons.

Having proclaimed a global policy of confrontation with countries of socialism, suppression of national liberation movements, and armed support of the interests of American monopolies, Washington lately has been making desperate efforts to "break" the military-strategic parity. The building up of "military muscles" is reflected in the continuous increase of the country's military budget.

In examining the dimensions and structure of the American war machine, the book shows that in its character it is a tool of imperialist coercion against nations and serves global expansionistic goals. At the present time the United States has more than 1,500 bases and installations on the territory of 32 states. There are over a half-million servicemen permanently stationed there. Military-strategic concepts, including the idea of a so-called "limited" nuclear war in Europe being elaborated in the United States bear an undisguised aggressive character.

Comparing the military forces of the two sides, the book's authors arrive at an important conclusion: An approximate military balance both between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO has taken shape and is being preserved both in the world as a whole and in Europe, where the most powerful groupings of Armed Forces directly oppose each other. The authors note that the Soviet Union believes that approximate equality is sufficient for defensive needs and does not set the goal of disrupting the existing equilibrium and attaining military superiority over the other side.

Washington's hopes to spurt forward in the arms race and achieve a position of military superiority are doomed to failure. As stated by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in answering questions from editors of the West German journal SPIEGEL, "dreams of achieving military superiority over the USSR are best cast aside. Should it be necessary the Soviet people will find the capacities to undertake any additional efforts and do everything necessary to assure reliable defense of their country. It is much more reasonable and realistic to speak about retaining parity which already exists and, as experience indicates, is a rather good foundation for preserving peace."

The specters inhabiting many of Hollywood's films live under cover of darkness and disappear when daylight comes. Something similar is occurring with the fantasies of the antisoviets--on being compared with the real facts they

scatter like smoke, leaving only the bad odor of a lie behind them. The thorough book published by the USSR Ministry of Defense Voennoye izdatel'stvo will help millions of troubled people on our planet find an answer to the question contained in its title: "The source of the threat to peace." And the knowledge inspires to action in defense to peace.

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## MILITARY SCIENCE, THEORY, STRATEGY

### TACTICAL TRAINING

#### Air Defense Tactical Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Dec 81 p 2

[Article by Col A. Kalyuzhnyy: "The Commander and Modern Combat: When the Situation Became Complicated..."]

[Text] As often happens in practice against real targets, the air situation grew complicated abruptly and unexpectedly. A group of "enemy" aircraft proceeding at a great distance from the surface-to-air missile [SAM] battalion position suddenly dispersed, changed speed and headed for the defended target at different altitudes. The launcher control officer was required to estimate the situation quickly and accurately, make a substantiated decision and implement it firmly. But Maj M. Antonenko, the battalion chief of staff who was performing duties as launcher control officer in practice, dawdled. He requested additional information and waited until the situation cleared up and the air "enemy's" plan became more apparent.

Without going into details of the further development of events, we will note that when Maj Antonenko finally made a decision and the teams began carrying out practice missile launches at his command, one of the targets was leaving the impact zone. The mission assigned the subunit was performed, but only with a satisfactory mark. Thus the sluggishness and uncertain leadership of subordinates did not permit full use of the capabilities of equipment and personnel, who by the way have performed even more difficult missions successfully more than once.

It should be emphasized--and this was confirmed by results of final inspections--that instances where subunit commanders or officers performing their duties make mistakes during tactical exercises and practices and do not make fully substantiated decisions are not such a very frequent phenomenon. But the circumstance that such instances occur usually at the most difficult moments of combat work, under conditions of an acute time deficit, cannot be written off. It stands to reason that each such instance demands a thorough analysis and fundamental evaluations and conclusions.

For example, what did the analysis of the practice headed by Maj Antonenko show? His uncertainty and inertness were explained by the fact that it was the first time the officer had encountered such a situation. It follows that he was not prepared in the professional sense for competent, faultless actions under difficult conditions.

Maj Antonenko has had more than one occasion to organize practices in the battalion and act as the director in the practices. Having a good knowledge of the capabilities of missile hardware and requirements placed on air defense specialists, the officer tried to make these practices be of maximum instructiveness for all personnel participating in them. He succeeded in this in the majority of cases, but while the practices were instructive for the personnel, this was not so for Antonenko himself.

What has been said is not in reproach of Maj Antonenko. That is approximately how matters stand with the organization of practices in some other SAM subunits as well. In training subordinates in the art of combat actions to repulse air "enemy" strikes, the commander at the same time receives little for improving his personal tactical training.

Here one has the right to ask the question: How can the commander himself best be taught the art of tactical control?

A system of professional training of combat leaders tested over the years and proven in practice has taken shape in troop units. These are tactical exercises and integrated practices at the unit level, demonstration and instructional methods classes organized on the basis of the best subunits, and special short exercises in which officers learn to estimate the situation and substantiate decisions made under conditions of a time deficit. These are very important and necessary training activities, but they should be supplemented by other effective and efficient forms of training.

One such form is individual training for the commander in the practice of controlling combat under difficult conditions. For example, staff officers I. Bondarenko, M. Kucheryavyy, P. Grin' and V. Il'yashenko have drawn up variants of an air "enemy" attack filled with acute situations which are practically possible in real combat. On arriving in a subunit, the staff officer holds a practice in which initially he himself acts as the director. The commander is nearby observing his actions. Later this same variant is played through several times until the commander (who now is directing the teams' actions) fully masters all techniques of tactical control.

This method is especially useful for officers recently appointed to command positions, but experienced commanders also find much of value and much that is instructive for themselves in such practices.

One of the most important conditions for professional improvement of officers who are directors of combat is to create those situations during practices which would contribute to an improvement in command qualities and demand thoughtful mental operation and a thorough analysis of the situation at hand. This naturally is possible only if, on the one hand, each practice is genuinely dynamic and instructive and, on the other hand, if its concept remains unknown to the commander and all troubles which arise during the air raid are revealed to him directly in the course of combat work. The fact is that no matter how difficult and dynamic the situation is, the practice will not provide much benefit for the commander if it is known ahead of time in



what sequence events will develop, at what point what kind of narrative problems will come in, and what the director of combat should undertake in this case. But that is just how it sometimes happens in practice. This results in an officer becoming accustomed to act under a stereotyped format after being deprived of an opportunity to display initiative and take an imaginative approach to the tactical control process.

And here the practice where it is not the subunit commander, but the unit staff which draws up the practice plan is very useful. Such plans, compiled by experienced officers, usually give comprehensive consideration to the specifics of missions being accomplished by a concrete SAM battalion or maneuver battalion, and features of their interaction with other subunits. In this case maximum benefit is achieved for all specialists without exception, from the rank-and-file team member to the commander.

I would like to direct attention also to the following aspect of the matter. Any tactical exercise or practice is of maximum benefit if the situation created in them is not subject to stereotypes and if it places every participant face to face with difficult decisions and unexpected situations and requires resolute actions of initiative. An interesting and instructive situation depends wholly on the competency of commanders and staff officers who draw up practice plans, and on their professional outlook and tactical competency. In this sense it is very important for commanders of all ranks to have the ability to organize genuinely difficult conditions for practices which are dictated by the very logic of development of actual combat. As experience shows, however, this matter oftentimes is not reflected either in individual plans for officers' independent training or in command training plans. It is hardly necessary to mention what this costs combat training.

In one practice directed by Maj S. Reznichenko the subunit received a low grade. That time the specialists made crude errors in their work and were not able to take full advantage of the equipment's capabilities. Maj Reznichenko himself was not able to estimate the situation rapidly at the decisive moment, dawdled and in the final account made an erroneous decision. Omissions in the professional training of the subunit's specialists are apparent, but for what reason? Combat training plans are fulfilled to the full extent here and classes are conducted using simulators and trainers and diversified narrative problems. The subunit commander and other subunit officers are firmly convinced that all training approximates conditions of actual combat to the maximum. But is this so?

Can situations be called difficult and instructive if they rove from practice plan to practice plan with slight changes and long ago became customary for all personnel? Is there much benefit from numerous narrative problems for which every specialist has practiced actions well and in which their application generates no particular difficulties? This very kind of situation was used widely in the subunit. It would appear that it cannot provide anything except the habit of stereotypes in combat work.

The commander is the director and organizer of combat. What concept he introduces in a practice, what narrative problems he uses and what forces he uses to accomplish an assigned mission are matters which always must be in the field of view of senior commanders. Unfortunately this sometimes is lost from view and the chief element taken into account is how the plan is fulfilled. And so it sometimes happens that all plans have been fulfilled and all missions worked, but a check shows that the very first unexpected situation places both the commander and his subordinates at a loss.

Many of our subunits have gained good experience in organizing combat training and making it approximate conditions of actual combat reality. I would like to note in particular the capable, thoroughly conceived use of narrative problems which considerably increase training effectiveness.

The experience of foremost commanders persuades us that with capable organization of combat training it is possible to achieve a high level of subordinates' training in a very short time.

#### Infantry Mountain Tactical Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Dec 81 p 2

[Letter by Sr Lt O. Yegorov and article by Lt Gen Yu. Tukharinov: "The Commander and Modern Combat: Maneuver in the Mountains"]

[Text] In a tactical exercise in the mountains the platoon I command had to operate as an enveloping detachment. We maneuvered in dismounted formation under difficult conditions: Using mountain climbing gear we scaled jutting cliffs and followed barely perceptible trails. Despite the difficulties, the detachment moved into the "enemy" rear and attacked at the time designated by the commander, but the attack failed. The "enemy" greeted us with dense fire. In evaluating our actions later in a critique the senior commander noted that the so-called mountain factor and the "enemy's" ability to take rapid and effective countermeasures under these conditions had not been fully considered in making the decision for the maneuver.

I would like to read an experienced specialist's opinion on these matters in the newspaper.

Sr Lt O. Yegorov.

It is difficult to overestimate the role of maneuver in modern combat for concentrating efforts where the enemy least expects an attack. Meanwhile, as Sr Lt Yegorov correctly notes in his letter, one cannot forget about those factors which at times complicate a maneuver.

I will note that conventional forms of maneuver such as the deep and close envelopment, their combination, and withdrawal, which were tested during the



Great Patriotic War, are typical of these actions, but mountain conditions leave their own imprint on them and introduce features to subunit operations which, if ignored, make success in combat difficult or completely impossible.

I will refer to the following example. A company commanded by Capt M. Kolesnikov was committed from the line of march as part of a battalion and was developing the attack successfully. The motorized riflemen encountered determined resistance in the depth of "enemy" defenses, especially in a sector where Capt Kolesnikov's company was attacking. The company commander realized that the defense would not be penetrated by a frontal attack. Reporting this to the battalion commander, the officer decided to make a deep envelopment with two platoons in order to strike the strongpoint on the hills from the rear, which was in keeping with the situation at hand, but failed to accomplish the maneuver. Uncovering the motorized riflemen's plan and determining that just one platoon was in front of him, the "enemy" himself moved into a counterattack and seized the initiative. Why did this happen?

This failure can be explained by several reasons. In particular, the company commander did not study the routes over which the platoons were supposed to maneuver (the APC's were not able to move up to the pass). Active reconnaissance was not performed in the company, which led to a situation where possible "enemy" countermeasures were not revealed. The motorized riflemen lost the factor of surprise, which is of decisive importance when fighting in the mountains. We will not go into details, but will mention one of the main lessons which officers learned from this exercise. During operations in the mountains a maneuver can be successful which is prepared and carried out in the shortest time periods, purposefully and decisively.

In each specific instance the choice of a particular kind of maneuver in the mountains is determined by the situation at hand, relative strength of personnel and weapons, the enemy grouping, terrain features and outline of the forward edge. It is important to avoid stereotypes here and prevent the repetition of one and the same tactical movement.

If an exercise has been well prepared and is held in a difficult and dynamic situation the commander has broad opportunities for mastering the art of maneuvering forces and weapons with consideration of the character of terrain. In this situation as probably in no other, there is vast room for a commander's initiative and for making independent decisions. An exercise held in the mountains with the motorized rifle battalion commanded by Maj V. Mari can serve as an example here in particular.

The battalion was assigned a mission of taking a pass which was screened from the south and southwest by weapons located in tiers, with slopes of narrow crevices well organized in the engineer sense. Scouts reported to the battalion commander that only on the northeast approaches to the pass had the "enemy" left a small screen, apparently relying on the relative impassability of the mountainous area. Maj Mari decided to send an enveloping detachment in this direction, to which he assigned a company commanded by Capt P. Kryakvin, attaching a mortar and a rocket launcher subunit to the company.

The battalion commander realized that the "enemy" might anticipate the appearance of an enveloping detachment in his rear, and so he relied on concealment of the company's advance and the personnel's excellent mountain training. Subunit actions were stepped up from the front by skilled maneuver of forces and weapons from flank to flank to lead the "enemy" astray. The "enemy" gained the impression that the attackers were seeking gaps in the combat formation on the flanks. Meanwhile the enveloping detachment shoved the defenders back from the hills, struck from the rear and penetrated to the pass. The "enemy" was forced to withdraw after not withstanding a simultaneous attack from three directions and suffering losses.

The maneuver was skillful and concealed. Its success was predetermined to a decisive extent by continuous and effective reconnaissance, which allowed the commander to conceal his intentions from the "enemy," guess the "enemy's" intentions and force the opposing side to fight under unfavorable conditions.

It appears very effective to use tactical airborne forces under mountain conditions in combination with an enveloping detachment and the frontal maneuver of subunits. An exercise held in motorized rifle regiment "X" is instructive in this sense.

Having set up an enveloping detachment, the regimental commander decided to assign a battalion commanded by Capt M. Sidorov as a tactical airborne force which was to seize several bridges over a mountain river near a pass and hold them until the arrival of the main body attacking from the front. The battalion was reinforced by a mortar and an engineer subunit and flamethrowers.

I will not go into detail on how the enveloping detachment and subunits from the front operated. They performed their missions successfully. I will dwell on the actions of the assault force, inasmuch as it was the coordination of motorized riflemen and aviators which played a deciding part in the regiment's overall success.

Much was decided by comprehensive support of the force's landing. Subunits assigned for reconnaissance landed ahead of the main body right near the targets for capture. This allowed having rather detailed information about the "enemy" and disposition of his weapons with the companies' move to the line of departure. Reconnaissance also determined the possibility of maneuvering over mountain trails, possibility of moving over mountain slopes and ridges, areas suitable for concealed concentration of the subunits, and terrain sectors permitting assumption of approach march and combat formations. As it turned out, there were no forces on the roads and bridges except for small security subunits, but an "enemy" reserve of up to a battalion in strength was located several kilometers from this area. After discovering the assault force, he could inflict serious losses on the motorized riflemen.

After evaluating all this the battalion commander decided to maneuver one company reinforced by mortars over mountain trails immediately after the force landed so that in case the defenders' reserve advanced it could be halted on approaches to the landing area. The remaining battalion forces were to seize road intersections and bridges, then assume a defense and hold them until the main body arrived.

Helicopters flew at low altitude, taking advantage of folds in the terrain. Motorized riflemen landed on a mountain plateau and the bridges and road intersection were seized. Soon subunits attacking from the front also arrived. Many factors predetermined success in accomplishing the assigned mission, in particular, the skillfully organized coordination between the landing force and subunits attacking from the front.

I recall an exercise which practiced a detachment's actions to take a mountain passage. A positive point was that battalion and company officers participated in studying the matter.

The detachment's composition and operating methods depended on the concrete conditions and above all on the character of engineer organization of the "enemy" defensive positions. Depending on the tactical situation, the detachment included motorized rifle, tank, artillery and engineer subunits, flame-thrower team and recovery equipment. Such reinforcement gave the detachment a certain tactical independence and maneuverability. For example, while operating on one of the axes the detachment greatly helped in accomplishing the missions facing the regiment in coordination with the tactical airborne force and subunits attacking from the front.

Successful maneuver is impossible in the mountains without firm, continuous and flexible control.

Warning orders which orient subordinates on conduct of a maneuver acquire special significance here. The commander's art consists of accurately determining the beginning, kind and sequence of a maneuver, personnel and weapons to be used for fire support, and the most favorable axis of operations. It is especially important not to lose fire initiative in accomplishing a maneuver. This is achieved above all by diversity in methods of conducting fire, disruption of the enemy's retaliatory maneuvers, and reliable fire and engineer support of exposed flanks.

Many tactical exercises will be held in the mountains during winter combat training. It is important for the concept of every exercise to envisage the commanders' extensive display of initiative so that officers learn the bold maneuver of fire and subunits and effective battlefield employment of combat equipment and weapons. Knowledge of the organization, weapons and operating tactics of the probable enemy and the physical-geographic conditions of a theater of military operations acquires more and more importance. All this is learned during exercises when the principle of learning what is necessary in war is steadfastly implemented in them.

#### Tactical Training and Arms Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jan 82 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen I. Vorob'yev, doctor of military sciences: "The Commander and Modern Combat: Weapons and Tactics"]

[Text] It is generally known that the development of equipment and weapons has a substantial influence on tactics of

modern combat, and there is a feedback here as well. I would like to see articles in the newspaper more often, including those on a theoretical plane, about the interconnection of weapons and tactics.

(From Capt S. Goncharuk's presentation at a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers' conference.)

As a component part of military art, tactics develops under the influence of many factors. In particular, the improvement in weapons and combat equipment plays a most important role here. Figuratively speaking, the means of armed conflict together with the people who handle them comprise the material basis of tactics. When means of conflict are improved, the character of combat also changes. V. I. Lenin pointed out this natural pattern. He wrote: "Military tactics depends on the level of military technology."

An understanding of this interconnection has both a theoretical and practical significance. One can gain a deep understanding of the character of modern combat, anticipate the prospects of its development and introduce something new into tactics only by relying on the material factor--the troops' combat capabilities, technical outfitting and all-around supply situation.

At the same time it is impossible to ignore the fact that the troops' technical potential acquires real force only in unification with high morale and proficiency of the personnel. Tactics is not a passive element with respect to weapons and combat equipment. It actively affects their improvement and methods of employment. As shown by the experience of the Great Patriotic War, the troops' tactical expertise can under certain conditions have a decisive influence on the outcome of armed conflict.

The interconnection of weapons and tactics in the present-day stage is becoming ever closer, above all because of the development of means of warfare under the influence of scientific-technical progress. Equipment and weapons were improved at high rates in the postwar period and nuclear missile weapons appeared.

Conventional means of destruction also are being modernized. As noted by foreign specialists, the firepower of close support artillery, for example, has risen an average of 50 percent in comparison with the World War II period and its range has increased 60 percent. Combat capabilities of tanks have increased. Army aviation has become an important factor for increasing the striking power and mobility of the Ground Forces. There has been a fundamental change in means of air attack. Jet aircraft fitted with controlled means of destruction and sophisticated sighting and navigation systems have come to replace piston-engined aircraft. Troop air defense also has become more effective.

The fundamental changes in means of armed conflict have had their effect on the development of tactics. As shown vividly by the experience of Exercise "Zapad-81," modern combat has become more dynamic, the intensity of delivered strikes has increased and troop maneuverability on the ground and in the air has become higher.



An increase in troop firepower has a primary effect on combat tactics. The arsenal of means of destruction has expanded significantly under present-day conditions in comparison with the Great Patriotic War period. Fire destruction of the enemy can be accomplished by all-arms means of combat with the participation of practically all kinds of weapons. The depth of fire pressure on the enemy has increased. A certain redistribution of the proportionate participation of different kinds of weapons in accomplishing fire missions is occurring. For example, while antitank artillery played the main part in destroying tanks during the war, now the tanks' dangerous enemy has become antitank guided missiles with high penetrating force, accuracy of fire and mobility. Combat helicopters also are an effective means of combating tanks.

Or take the following fact for example. In the past mixed minefields were considered strictly a defensive means. Now they also are becoming an offensive weapon. During exercises in NATO armies, for example, remote mining of the terrain is employed using salvo fire rocket systems and aircraft for the purpose of creating unique engineer fire obstacles in the rear of a defending enemy. It is believed that use of this method will expand the range of missions accomplished by mixed minefields: in particular, constraining the maneuver of advancing enemy reserves, hindering their commitment, disrupting the operation of control points and logistics entities, disorganizing road movement and so on.

All this indicates that fire in the broad sense now has acquired new qualities. Inasmuch as all or almost all unit and subunit means of combat participate in destruction by fire, the combined-arms commander becomes its chief organizer. Based on the tactical concept, he determines the missions and methods of fire destruction.

The commander naturally is required to have a great art for organizing fire destruction of the enemy and skillful concentration of fire efforts on the main axis at the decisive moment of combat. During the Great Patriotic War, for example, much attention was given to the massing of weapons in offensive operations, by which decisive superiority was achieved over the enemy in artillery and other weapons in penetration sectors. Thus artillery density in the Belorussian, L'vov-Sandomierz, Jassy-Kishinev, Vistula-Oder, Berlin and a number of other operations was 200 and sometimes even more guns and mortars per kilometer of front. Under present-day conditions, however, the effectiveness of fire efforts will be achieved above all by complete use of the increased destructive might and mobility of means of combat, including aviation, combat helicopters, and the fire of motorized rifle and tank subunits.

A qualitatively new interrelationship between weapons and tactics in the present stage also is manifested in such elements of combat as attack and maneuver. The role and importance of the attack are rising under the effect of new means of combat. The attack is a special form of combat actions and the effective employment of various means of combat: nuclear weapons (a nuclear attack), the combat potential of artillery and aviation (an attack by fire), and the fire and attack power of motorized rifle and tank subunits (an attack by troops). In combat a series of different, interrelated attacks is delivered with their common characteristic feature being the diversity of methods of preparation and delivery. For example, depending on time of delivery, an attack in combat may

be preemptive, meeting or retaliatory and, depending on the form in which it is delivered, frontal, flank or a combination.

The nuclear attack is of special significance. In this instance subunit actions are aimed at the fastest and fullest exploitation of the results of nuclear destruction of the enemy. Depending on the situation, an attack by fire either supplements a nuclear attack or is an independent means of destroying the enemy. As with the nuclear attack, fire is combined with a troop attack. Fire only becomes an effective means of defeating the enemy when its results are used by the troops promptly and fully, i.e., when it is continuously combined with the movement of subunits.

The increase in fire and attack power of units and subunits creates objective preconditions for increasing the decisiveness of their combat actions and conducting an offensive at a high tempo and to a great depth. One must take into account that troops on the defense essentially are using the very same arsenal of means of combat as the attackers. The defense is becoming more and more active. One of the typical trends in improving the defense is the increase in its antitank stability through saturation of subunit combat formations with various armored vehicles, weapons and mixed minefields. Figuratively speaking, the defense is becoming armored.

Under such conditions success of the offensive depends to a decisive extent on reliability of fire destruction, especially of antitank weapons; on speed in negotiating artificial obstacles; and on disorganizing the enemy's command and control and fire control systems. Combat experience indicates that the swifter and more assertively an attack is conducted and the more precisely and closely fire and attack are coordinated, the fewer the losses which attackers suffer and the faster they cross the zone of dense, multilayered fire of antitank and other enemy weapons and penetrate the defense.

Skilled selection of methods of delivering an attack is one of the primary conditions of its success. Great Patriotic War experience is instructive in this respect. In organizing an offensive, Soviet commanders would make skilled use of weak spots in the enemy's combat alignment--intervals between strongpoints and exposed flanks--for routing the enemy. An attack often would be delivered in almost inaccessible sectors of the terrain. The nighttime, difficult meteorological conditions and so on would be used to achieve surprise. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this experience for training troops in bold actions of initiative, tactical movements unexpected by the enemy, the delivery of combination attacks from the ground and air, and rapid shift of efforts from one axis to another in the course of combat. The experience of Exercise "Zapad-81" also provides a great deal on this plane.

The development of equipment and weapons also affects the content and character of maneuver. The proportion of maneuver actions in the attack and on the defense is growing.

Commanders' art of maneuvering is expressed in an ability to anticipate the enemy in deployment, in opening fire, and in delivering an attack; to regroup forces and weapons in a very short time and take up a favorable attack position;

to concentrate subunit fire efforts quickly on the most important targets; to make swift use of the results of fire to develop success into the depth and toward the flanks; to make a nonstop crossing (detour) of zones of radioactive contamination, devastation and inundation; and to make assault crossings of water obstacles from the move. Inasmuch as the enemy also will strive to accomplish a maneuver, it is important to be able to disrupt his counter-maneuver, to gain time, to better him in rates of movement, to outwit him and to impose one's will on him.

Thus the new goals in perfecting modern arms also are new levels in development of the methods of combat. The improvement of means of combat represents the basis and most powerful stimulant in the development of tactics. But new forms and methods of combat actions do not appear spontaneously when more effective weapons come into the troops' hands. An imaginative search is needed here and it is important to bear in mind that an improvement in tactics is not necessarily linked with modernization of arms. Tactics improves also within the framework of the existing material base of combat. Here is an example.

During the initial period of the Great Patriotic War tanks which supported rifle troops in the attack would function in a scattered fashion without close interaction with the infantry. Their efforts often were dissipated in many directions and this did not produce the proper combat effect. The situation changed abruptly when the Soviet command began to use tactics of mass employment of close-support tanks in decisive sectors.

The present stage of development of military affairs, characterized by a further improvement in means of armed conflict, opens up broad opportunities for innovation in tactics. During Exercise "Zapad-81" ground and naval forces clearly demonstrated high tactical proficiency and excellent field, air and naval schooling. There is no doubt that the experience of these and other exercises will play no small part in the further development of Soviet military theory and the improvement of techniques and methods of modern combat.

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## ARMED FORCES

### ROCKET FORCES AND ARTILLERY DAY ARTICLES

Today -- Rocket Forces and Artillery Day. The Fatherland's Shield of Fire

Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 19 Nov 81 p 2

[Article by Marshal of Artillery P.N. Kuleshov]

[Excerpt] In the post-war years reactionary circles of the imperialist countries, relying on the American monopoly in nuclear weapons, began to hatch plans for an aggressive war against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. In this complex situation our party and government were forced to adopt measures to strengthen the defensive capability of the country. There was a requirement to create our own nuclear weapons and reliable means of delivering them on targets in the very shortest time. Our country successfully accomplished this task with tremendous difficulty. In 1947 the first ballistic missile was launched, and three years later the tests of a more highly perfected rocket were carried out. An outstanding event was the creation in 1957 of the world's first intercontinental ballistic missile. In 1949 an atomic bomb was exploded, and in 1953, before the United States, a hydrogen bomb was detonated. With this the American monopoly in nuclear weapons came to an end.

The appearance of nuclear-rocket weapons demanded the most fundamental realignment of the organizational structure of our forces. A new branch of the USSR Armed Forces was created -- the Strategic Rocket Forces. In the quarter century of their existence they have been transformed into a force of high combat readiness; they have become a reliable shield of our Fatherland and of the countries of the socialist community. Soviet strategic rockets have unlimited range, high accuracy, and are capable of carrying thermonuclear warheads of enormous power.

Our ground forces have also undergone radical changes. The nucleus of their firepower consists today of operational-tactical and tactical nuclear rockets. Also much further developed are tube and recoilless artillery weapons, which are a powerful means of destroying the enemy on the battlefield. Contemporary artillery systems are distinguished by their great mobility, range and accuracy of fire.

The quality of the personnel of the rocket and artillery troops also changed. At the present time almost all of them have intermediate and higher education, and are party members and Komsomols. Units are commanded by thoroughly trained officer personnel.

Today's generation of rocket and artillery troops is a worthy successor to the combat glory of the older generations. By their everyday martial labor they persistently improve their military skills; tirelessly increase their political and professional knowledge; and persistently master the science of conquering. A true school of military skill and a serious examination in combat maturity was an exercise code-named "Zapad-81", which was conducted this year. During this exercise rocket and artillery subunits conducted live firing with ratings of "good" and "excellent".

The rocketeers and artillerists greet their traditional holiday with high scores in combat and political training. Just like all the warriors of our illustrious Armed Forces, they vigilantly follow the intrigues of the enemies of peace and are prepared at a moment's notice to deal a decisive rebuff to any aggressor; to reliably protect the sacred frontiers of our Fatherland and of all the countries of the socialist community.

#### A Shield of Fire for the Fatherland

Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 19 Nov 81 p 3

[Article by Col Gen Yu. Yashin, first deputy commander-in-chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, laureate of the USSR State Prize]

[Text] Each year on 19 November the Soviet people, as well as the warriors of the army and navy, mark a national holiday -- Rocket Forces and Artillery Day. This day was not selected by accident. It was in fact on 19 November 1942 that the powerful salvoes of 15,000 guns, mortars and multiple rocket launchers began a counteroffensive by the Soviet Army at the walls of heroic Stalingrad which was grandiose in its scope and significance; a counteroffensive which was fated to be the beginning of a radical turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War and of all World War II,

This year the traditional holiday of the rocketeers and artillerists is marked in an atmosphere of high political and labor enthusiasm on the part of our entire people, which lives and works today under the inspiring influence of the ideas and decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress.

The Communist Party and the Soviet Government steadfastly and consistently struggle for peace and relaxation of tensions, for prevention of a new world war and armed conflicts.

L. I. Brezhnev, in his answers to the editors of the West German magazine "DER SPIEGEL" emphasized: "The Soviet Union threatens nobody; it intends to attack nobody. And our military doctrine is a defensive one. It rules out preventive war and the "first strike" concept. With all sincerity I can also proclaim that the Soviet Union under no circumstances will employ nuclear weapons against any state which renounces their production or acquisition, and which does not have them on its territory. We are prepared on a treaty basis to guarantee that to any country without a single exception."

Belliciously inclined militarist circles, led by American imperialism, have unleashed an arms race unprecedented in scale. They avoid in every possible way treaties to restrict the rearmament process, to eliminate centers of tension, and to achieve a peaceful solution of controversial international problems. They strive by any means to alter the balance of power to their advantage and to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, to the detriment of relaxation of international tensions and security of peoples.

It also cannot help but alarm us that under pressure from Washington the leaders of NATO, citing the mythical "Soviet military threat", intend to deploy in Western Europe American medium range missiles in addition to the already existing nuclear means. The decision of the U.S. administration to begin serial production of the "MX" intercontinental ballistic missile and full-scale production of neutron weapons is a challenge to all mankind.

Under these conditions the Communist Party considers it its sacred duty henceforward to tirelessly conduct a policy of curbing war and aggression; to adopt measures for further strengthening the defense capability of the Soviet state and the entire socialist community; to do everything to insure that henceforward the glorious Armed Forces of the Soviet Union have at their disposal all the necessary means to carry out their responsible mission -- to be a reliable guard of the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, a bulwark of universal peace.

In carrying out this historic mission a worthy contribution is being made by the personnel of the Rocket Troops and Artillery. Equipping the Soviet Armed Forces with nuclear rocket weapons called for a true revolution in military science. The organizational structure and the entire style of life and activities of our forces underwent a radical change. The views on the conduct of war as a whole were re-examined. The most striking expression of the profound qualitative transformation in military science was the creation of a new type of the Armed Forces -- the Strategic Rocket Forces. This was announced in January 1960 at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Since that time more than two decades have passed. In this time the Rocket Forces have achieved a qualitatively new level of development. They are armed with the most highly perfected rocket systems, with rockets of intercontinental and medium range, capable of delivering nuclear warheads of enormous destructive force with great accuracy, of delivering inevitable strikes on an aggressor no matter where he is located.

Because of the daily concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet people the Rocket Forces are at constant combat readiness. Even in peacetime they are carrying out a combat mission of national significance; they man their posts continuously.

In recent years the combat capability of the other types of the Armed Forces has also increased. The Ground Forces possess tremendous firepower and striking power, as well as high maneuverability; they are equipped with both operational-tactical and tactical rockets. The combat capability of the rocket and artillery

systems of Air Defense of the Country Troops and of the Navy has increased immeasurably,

But no matter how powerful modern military materiel may be, its master and the decisive force in battle has been and remains man, ideologically convinced, skillfully mastering the weapon entrusted to him, morally prepared for any test in the name of achieving victory,

With each year better trained people are being assigned to rocket and artillery units. Today in the Rocket Troops, for example, over 90 percent of the soldiers and sergeants have intermediate or higher education. This enables them in a compressed time period to master the complex combat weapons and equipment, and to man their posts in an exemplary manner. Experienced and highly qualified officers command the units and subunits. Their reliable bulwarks and loyal assistants are the political workers and the party and Komsomol organizations. In the Rocket Forces more than 75 percent of the officers have engineering training and more than 90 percent are rated specialists, true masters of military science.

Ever-increasing military skills, a high degree of teamwork, and remarkable combat-morale qualities were demonstrated by the troops in Exercise "Zapad-81", which was directed by member of the Politburo of the CP CC and Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov.

Every rocketeer and artillerist is inspired by the realization that, as they vigilantly stand guard over the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, the Soviet Armed Forces are making and will continue to make a heavy contribution to the cause of bolstering peace and international security; and to facilitating implementation of the majestic plans outlined by the historical 26th CPSU Congress.

#### Loyal Sons of the Fatherland

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 18 Nov 81 p 3

[Article by Colonel General V. Vishenkov, Chief of the Main Staff of the Strategic Rocket Forces]

[Excerpts] The first rocket units were formed from the best multiple rocket launcher artillery units. Creation of the Strategic Rocket Forces was a necessary measure taken to counter atomic blackmail and the threat of nuclear war, principally from the side of the United States,

The Rocket Troops have changed unrecognizably in recent years. Wide application of the achievements of science and technology and of automated systems of control in military science have significantly increased their combat capability. They are armed with modern rockets capable of carrying warheads with colossal explosive power and of carrying out inevitable strikes on an aggressor regardless of his location.



The high combat readiness of our units is the principal factor in deterring the aggressive designs of the imperialists. The warrior-rocketeers execute round-the-clock combat watch, which is the main event of their life, in carrying out a mission of particular national importance,

While paying our due to their mighty weapons and equipment, we above all take pride in their masters. Almost all the unit commanders have a higher military engineering education. Most of them have completed a military academy. More than 75 percent of the officers have engineering training, and 90 percent hold high specialist ratings.

Great qualitative changes have occurred among the private and sergeant personnel. The men have a high general educational level, a broad cultural outlook. They skilfully master the combat materiel. The overwhelming majority of the personnel are party members or Komsomols. The characteristic moral quality of the young rocketeers is their deep understanding of the civic necessity for service in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces, and their love for modern combat materiel and for the Rocket Troops.

The principles of high moral-political and combat qualities are acquired by the young men long before their military service begins. A tremendous role in forming these qualities is played by the family, the school, and also the work of party, trade union and Komsomol organizations and volunteer sports associations. A significant contribution in preparing pre-induction and induction age youth is made by the Defense Society. For example, last year one out of three inductees into our service had finished a DOSAAF school, and had received the specialty of radio-telegrapher, electrician, operator, diesel mechanic or driver. This assisted them in mastering the complex combat materiel in a short time.

During their service in our units the young men acquire considerable life experience. In that period they experience intensive ideological growth, an active position in life is formed; their sense of collectivism is developed, and their characters and wills are forged. This is a period in which they acquire psychological stability and physical endurance.

At the same time military service is a school of modern technical knowledge and high technical culture. In two years the servicemen acquire knowledge almost equal in scope to an intermediate technical education. Many specialties acquired by the personnel are also needed in the national economy. It is not a coincidence that every year tens of thousands of the best discharged servicemen travel on Komsomol authorizations to high-priority construction projects to work.

Warriors of the 1980's, including rocketeers, have taken to themselves the best qualities of the older generation: a fervent love for the Fatherland and hatred for the enemy, combat skill, bravery and courage. Their standard for life has become allegiance to the military oath, high vigilance, strong discipline, and constant readiness to fulfill their constitutional duty to the people.

The current training year now being concluded in the Armed Forces was intensive. This was occasioned by the responsible tasks assigned to the Armed Forces by the 26th Party Congress, by the sharp aggravation of the international situation through the fault of US military circles and the increased demands for combat readiness.

In the units socialist competition under the slogan: "For high combat readiness and firm military discipline" aroused widespread interest. The winner was the initiator of this movement among the troops -- the personnel of the unit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel I. Shelestov. This coordinated collective earned the rating of excellent for the sixth consecutive time.

The state of combat training of the warrior-rocketeers, their teamwork and professional skill were tested during the course of training launches, in complicated exercises which maximally approached actual combat conditions, in the conduct of periodic technical servicing, readiness tests, and scored inspections. Every serviceman, whether a general, an officer, a warrant officer, a sergeant or a private, strove to achieve the highest results. At times situations occurred which demanded the utmost personal effort; the exertion of all moral-political, spiritual, mental and physical strengths. For example, in one unit a complex situation arose in a tactical exercise immediately before the launch of a rocket. It was required in a brief period, under field conditions, at night, and also in a lightning storm, to analyze the condition of the units of the computer and the logic element, to model the processes taking place in the "electronic brain" of the apparatus, and then to take action.

This required profound engineering knowledge, equal to the knowledge of a designer, the solid practical skills of a maintenance technician, and the boldness and will of an inventor. And indeed such qualities were demonstrated by officers N. Malygin, Yu. Novosel'tsev and I. Puchkin. All are outstanding in combat and political training and specialists of the highest class.

Twice a year, in spring and fall, the new conscripts report to the units. This is the time when a new contingent of young men takes the places in the army's ranks of those who have been discharged into the reserves. Many already in their first year will become outstanding in combat and political training, capable specialists. This is facilitated by the moral atmosphere in the units, by international friendship and military camaraderie, by effective political indoctrination work.

The personnel of the Rocket Forces celebrate their holiday closely united around the Communist Party under conditions of the nation-wide struggle to implement the historic decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress. The rocketeers are exerting all their efforts toward increased military skill, vigilance and constant combat readiness. As are all the warriors of our glorious Armed Forces, they are always on the alert; they piously fulfill their duty to protect the gains of socialism.

## Always on Watch

Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 47, 16-22 Nov 81 p 12

[Interview with Lt Gen V. Mitropov, first deputy chief of the political directorate of the Strategic Rocket Forces, on the occasion of Rocket Forces and Artillery Day by V. Naumov, date and place not specified]

[Text] Victor Nikolayevich Mitronov has an amazing military record: he saw his first combat early in the morning on 22 June on the Western border, where he was in command of a patrol. He fought in the siege of Leningrad and on the Pulkovskiy heights, and at Nevskaya Dubrovka, and later on other fronts. He participated in the battles for Berlin and the liberation of Prague. Then he finished a military academy and for 20 years has served in the Strategic Rocket Forces.

[Question] Viktor Nikolayevich, tell us what is most characteristic today of the combat training and life of the rocketeers?

[Answer] I believe that the most noteworthy thing is the continuous search for the new. It is aimed at mastering the complex combat materiel and perfecting its maintenance in the shortest possible time, and in the final analysis at, having received the combat order, putting the weapons in action as rapidly as possible, in a matter of seconds. The purpose of strategic rockets and many of their technical characteristics -- in particular their tremendous speed, exceeding by ten times the initial velocity of an artillery projectile -- are widely known today, and therefore I believe it is not necessary to explain why we reckon time in seconds and fractions of seconds...

In this regard I would like to say that we warrior-rocketeers, like all the Soviet people, hope that intercontinental and other rockets will never lift into the air with live warheads. We enthusiastically endorse and support those tremendous efforts exerted by our party, the Soviet government, and personally by Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev to prevent war. Concern for peace and for the well-being of peoples permeated the decisions made and materials compiled during the CPSU CC Plenum and the VI Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. All of us, as soldiers, are educated in the spirit of our military doctrine, which is of a defensive character and is aimed at protecting the socialist gains of the peoples, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the USSR, and the security of our friends and allies.

It is well known, however, that recently certain imperialist circles, and particularly in the United States, are increasing international tension and are feverishly intensifying the arms race. Under these conditions Soviet servicemen take it as their duty to even more persistently master our modern weapons and to increase our vigilance and combat readiness.

A sense of personal responsibility for security of the Fatherland generates in our servicemen particular incentive in service, in combat training; it also



gives rise to that enthusiasm to search for new methods of which I spoke earlier.

[Question] My next question, Viktor Nikolayevich, concerns the everyday life of the rocketeers. Indeed, strategic rockets are not deployed in populated areas. Does this mean that your soldiers live far from large cities?

[Answer] They live on military bases, on which comfortable, well-equipped barracks have been built for the troops and modern residential housing for officers and their families. On our installations one may see all the characteristic features of city life and culture: movie theaters, clubs, stadiums, swimming pools, day nurseries and kindergartens. On every base there is a "recreational microzone", which in facilities and comfort concedes nothing to a good park of recreation and culture. All this is a manifestation of the great concern of the party and the people for Soviet servicemen. And the inhabitants themselves, beginning with the young school children, actively participate in the construction and improvements.

[Question] And the last, traditional question: what have your rocketeers to report on their holiday?

[Answer] We are happy to report to the party and the people that our warrior-rocketeers performed all their combat training assignments successfully; rocket launches and firing as a rule were rated "excellent". Our combat training, as in all the Soviet Armed Forces, is organically associated with ideological, volitional and physical conditioning. As a result they become not only capable specialists but also people with high morale and combat qualities. On the eve of Rocket Forces and Artillery Day we compile the results of the periodic phase of socialist competition. They suffice it to say, demonstrate the level of our development. Thus, not long ago the goal of one socialist pledge was: to reach the point that every combat crew consists of 1st and 2nd Class Specialists. This was followed by the obligation: every crew is to have some masters of a combat specialty. But today one of the central slogans in socialist competition is formulated as follows: "From a master in every crew to a crew of masters!"

In conclusion, I would like to say that on our holiday, as on every other day, the regular shifts report to their combat watches, which we carry out on a constant basis. The warriors of the strategic are always on guard!

Today -- Rocket Forces and Artillery Day.  
The Firepower of the Fatherland

Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian 19 Nov 81 p 4

[Article by Lt Gen V. Zakharov, commander of Rocket Forces and Artillery, Red Banner Transcaucasian Military District]

[Excerpt] In the postwar years the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, taking into consideration the aggressive nature of imperialism and the lessons of the past, have qualitatively transformed the Armed Forces. The successes achieved

in developing industry, science and technology permitted the creation of a new type of Armed Forces -- the Strategic Rocket Forces -- the nucleus of the combat might of our country.

Outstanding service in developing rocket technology was rendered by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. During the years of development of various types of rockets the office of the secretary of the CPSU CC was a unique headquarters. There the most important problems of rocket construction were decided; there were conducted conferences of the most eminent scholars, designers, and specialists in various fields of science, technology and production.

Rocket and artillery units today are equipped not only with first class armaments and combat equipment. Their greatest wealth is the troops, who have mastered to perfection the terrible weapons.

The rocketeers and artillerists of the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District carry on the combat traditions of their grandfathers and fathers in a worthy manner. They vigilantly keep an eye on the intrigues of the aggressors and are prepared at a moment's notice to rise to the defense of the sacred frontiers of our Fatherland.

The warriors of the military district are closely associated with the labor collectives of the Transcaucasus republics; they constantly perceive the concern shown for them on the part of party and soviet organs. They are grateful for that attention to people in uniform, and respond to it with exemplary training and service.

The rocketeers and artillerists of the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District, standing watch on the southern frontier of our Fatherland, understand well the complexity of today's international situation. In observing Rocket Forces and Artillery Day they insure their mother Communist Party of their readiness to honorably fulfill their patriotic and international duty -- to administer a rebuff to any aggressor if he attempts to violate the peaceful labor of the Soviet people.

Today -- Rocket Forces and Artillery Day,  
In Combat Formation

Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA 19 Nov 81 p 3

[Article by Maj Gen Arty S. Lebedev]

[Excerpt] The Soviet Army is armed with the most up-to-date artillery systems. But it is well known that weapons and equipment become a threat only when they are manned by capable people. It may be said with assurance that our powerful and terrible materiel is in capable and reliable hands. Today's generation of rocketeers and artillerists are distinguished by high general educational and military-technical training, which is integrated with political maturity and ideological conviction.

The Soviet Union struggles firmly and consistently for peace and relaxation of tensions. The peace-loving foreign policy course of the Soviet state is laid out in a program document -- in the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress. The peace-loving course of the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community is

opposed by the reactionary forces of imperialism with an adventuristic policy of undermining relaxation of international tensions, of exacerbating the arms race. Hiding behind the concept "of the Soviet military threat", world imperialism, and above all, American, is conducting intensive preparations. In 1981 the military budget of the United States alone exceeds 180 billion dollars, and in 1982 the Reagan administration is planning for 226 billion dollars for the military departments. All the NATO countries, under pressure from the United States, are also engaged in military preparations.

Under these conditions the warriors of the Soviet Armed Forces, including the rocketeers and artillerists, must be constantly prepared to repulse aggression no matter whence it comes. The rocketeers and artillerists of the Red Banner Belorussian Military District are profoundly aware that readiness to defend the socialist Fatherland is developed in everyday military labor.

A serious test of the combat and ideological maturity of Rocket Forces and Artillery personnel was Exercise "Zapad-81", conducted in the Belorussian and Baltic Military Districts and in the Baltic Sea from 4 to 12 September 1981. The warrior-artillerists demonstrated increased technical, special and tactical training, high morale and psychological qualities. Especially distinguishing themselves were N. Kukhareenko from Minsk, N. Makarenko, V. Bel'chikov and A. Nosikov from Mogilev, S. Yermak from Brestskaya Oblast, A. Grishchenko from Mogilevskaya Oblast, and many others.

Most of the rocket and artillery subunits of the district fulfilled in full measure their socialist obligations in perfecting combat training, in preparing soldiers for "outstanding" ratings in combat training, and in training rated specialists and masters of firing. Many of them completed the year with high scores. Results of the training year convincingly demonstrate that year in and year out our leading commanders and political officers I. Sobolevskiy, G. Zaytsev, V. Tetyanikov, A. Limarov, I. Furs and many others creatively approach their assigned tasks, have high scores in combat and political training, and execute training plans and socialist obligations with high quality.

As always, in the vanguard of fine deeds and initiatives march the party members and Komsomols. In this they stand out as truly ideologically convinced warriors, champions of discipline; they show themselves to be models in service and training.

In marking their traditional holiday, the rocketeers and artillerists together with all the men of the USSR Armed Forces stand vigilantly on guard of the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, in defense of the state interests of our great Fatherland.

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## AIR FORCES

### AIR FORCE ACTIVITIES

#### Helicopter Tactical Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Dec 81 p 1

[Article by Major A. Petrov, Central Group of Forces: "Airfield Strike"]

[Text] A new input came in just before the tactical flying exercise. The helicopter pilots were given the mission of striking an "enemy" airfield. It was explained in this case that a group of airplanes had already attempted to break through to the objective, but unsuccessfully: Protected by hills and antiaircraft resources, it remained operational. Meanwhile reconnaissance established that the opposing side was intending to exploit its successful combat namely by initiating a tactical airborne landing from this airfield. Helicopter pilots headed by Lieutenant Colonel A. Sorokin had to foil this plan.

It was no accident that the unit commander's choice fell upon Sorokin. One of the most experienced pilots and a recipient of the order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces," 3d Degree, this officer immediately realized that the mission would have to be performed in especially complex conditions. His strong ability for making full use of the fighting capabilities of the aviation equipment entrusted to him and his firm knowledge of ground troop tactics helped Sorokin arrive at the correct decision. The regiment commander gave his approval to it.

The essence of his plan was to select an optimum route and engage in combat maneuvers that would permit the attackers to surmount the "enemy" air defenses. The strike was to be made from a complex maneuver in order to achieve surprise.

Of course in making this decision Lieutenant Colonel Sorokin considered the training level of his subordinates and of the subunit as a whole. The squadron commander had no doubt in the high skill of the crews. And his confidence had valid grounds. It would be sufficient to note that the squadron completed the last training year in the ranks of the excellent units and that it is now leading the socialist competition in relation to many indicators. The squadron has managed to reduce the time required to achieve combat readiness by 5 percent. Two-thirds of the subunit's troop commanders are now military pilots 1st and 2d class. Most technicians and junior air specialists have passed their class qualification tests.



Nonetheless, it has long been a firm rule for Lieutenant Colonel Sorokin to prepare for all missions in the most meticulous fashion. Both he and the officers subordinated to him knew quite well that combat forgives no mistakes, meaning that nothing should be left out of personal training. And so on the day before the attack the airmen gathered together at the appointed time to thoroughly study the evolved tactical situation on the ground and the weather conditions and to acquaint themselves with the characteristics of the route. Following this, a tactical briefing was held. Highly informative reports were given by Major V. Frolkin, Captain A. Agapitov and Senior Lieutenant N. Ovsyannikov. The comrades also listened attentively to a message from Captain V. Kas'yanenko. He described the experience of helicopter subunit crews in similar conditions at the "Zapad-81" exercise.

At precisely the appointed time the combat helicopters took to the air. It was very important to make maximum use of the element of surprise. The crews confidently maneuvered between the hilltops just above the ground. At a prearranged point a pair led by the commander of an outstanding flight, Captain V. Galushko, turned into a canyon. Meanwhile the helicopter piloted by Captain A. Sekriyer began skirting the mountain ridge on the left at top speed. This ensured covertness and simultaneousness of the attack from two directions. They were followed by a group led by Lieutenant Colonel Sorokin. "Maneuver," his voice broke the silence of the airwaves.

The helicopters hopped up energetically and rushed forward in the attack. In counted seconds Pilot-Operator Senior Lieutenant Ovsyannikov skillfully struck the target. All of the helicopter groups led by Lieutenant Colonel Sorokin acted just as confidently. The strike against the "enemy" airfield could not be opposed.

The hard labor of the airmen is filled with a great desire to achieve new successes in training and service.

#### Delay of Transit Flights Criticized

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Dec 81 p 2

[Article by Captain I. Berdnikov, crew commander, military pilot 1st class:  
"Barriers on the Route"]

[Text] The question with which my letter is concerned is not new. I recall that KRSNAYA ZVEZDA had carried an article on this before, and steps had been taken. But unfortunately the situation had not changed much for the better.

I am referring to the delays flight crews still experience during long flights when they land at intermediate airfields. One need not search far for an example; let me tell you about the ordeals of our crew. We have now been en route for many days already, but we have managed to travel less than half the distance. True, the road is long. This is why we went by air. The speed of a helicopter is sufficient to cover the entire distance on this route, together with all of the stops, in just a few days.

Why the delays? There can be no complaints about the weather--that is not where the problem lies. Moreover only the experienced, best trained crews usually

participate in such flights. The flight qualifications of our crewmembers permit them to fly in the most complex weather conditions. And the equipment is working faultlessly. We prepare especially carefully for each take-off. We come to the airfield early each time for this very reason. The flight documents are filled out as required, the appropriate notification is submitted, and on time as well. The weathermen acquaint us with the meteorological situation--the weather permits flying. But no. Permission to take off never comes.

Here is the way it often happens: The duty officers at the flight control center change shifts in the morning. This is where the trouble begins. The relieved flight controller, whom we managed to annoy with our requests the day before, no longer comes to the phone. And the flight controller who has just gone on duty is too busy: He has to work himself into the day's routine, and then once again call the airfield to which we were supposed to fly. But to make matters worse the official who could give the O.K. to our arrival was nowhere to be found. So what do you do? You wait around as the day wastes away toward evening. And the next day it is the same thing all over again.

Sometimes of course things go differently, though the result is just as discomforting. In such a case an attempt is made to justify the delay in taking off by various "objective" causes.

For example we suddenly find out that the airfield cannot accept incoming flights because, they say, there is no place to park our helicopter. If you imagine how much room our craft needs, you can see that is a contrived excuse. After all this is not a giant like the Il-76. Therefore the real reason must be something else--the desire to avoid the trouble of housing the crew, refueling the helicopter and providing other forms of support. But we do not claim any sort of special treatment. Incidentally, during this trip we were quartered in the strangest places you can imagine. Comfort is no concern to us.

One might ask: Why do I not give the names of concrete officials responsible for such problems due to their mismanagement? But one can hardly name them all. Were I to do so, I would come up with a long list of people who enjoy raising large and small barriers at intermediate airfields in the Kiev, Moscow, Volga and other military districts, at which we have spent weeks haunting the thresholds of flight control centers.

As I tell my story I recall those days when our crew participated in the "Zapad-81" exercise. In that exercise it was much more difficult to fly to other airfields. But efficient steps were always taken to get the crew up in the air as quick as possible. But with day-to-day flying the goal seems to be hold onto us a little longer, to doom the crew to inactivity, to remove it and the craft in which it wishes to fly from the training process. Winter combat training is now at its peak, and we are losing time for no reason at all.

But I still believe that this problem--providing sufficient support to crews on long flights--is not all that insoluble. It may be solved if both those who participate in such flights and those who must support them perform their duties with a sense of responsibility.

From the editor: Captain I. Berdnikov's letter is not the only one in the mailbag. A similar letter came to us from the commander of an air detachment, Military Pilot 1st Class Officer Ye. Zolotov. He also reports cases of delays in flights on another route, the end point of which is one of the airfields of the Baltic Military District. The crew under his charge was unable to leave this airfield for a long time due to the unsatisfactory work of persons responsible for the flight.

The editor's office hopes that these incidents will be discussed appropriately by the Air Force Main Headquarters and that more-effective measures will be implemented to correct the shortcomings communicated by the authors of these letters.

#### Aircraft Technical Officer Relieved

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jan 82 p 2

[Article by Senior Lieutenant V. Zdanyuk, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "A Harsh Lesson: From the Life of Young Officers"]

[Text] The flying shift neared its end. The fighter bomber in which Senior Lieutenant of Technical Service Viktor Gutnik was the technician was one of the last to land. The pilot had made no remarks about the work of the equipment in the air, and Gutnik began his postflight inspection with a light heart. Mechanic Warrant Officer Rostislav Bazulin, an experienced specialist, assisted him. One can always rely on him, the officer believed.

Having examined one of the air intakes Gutnik proceeded to the next. It was already covered over with a red hood. He stretched his arms toward it automatically, but then the technician wavered, thinking: "Is there any sense in opening it? Bazulin probably already checked it...."

There was no flying on the next day. The officer-technician worked on the aircraft assigned to him, checking out its technical state. But once again he turned no attention to the air intake. A day later an order came in to spot check the engine. It was only now that Gutnik peered into it. And his blood chilled: A dark oily spot could be distinctly seen in one place on the metal, and next to it a feather. There could be no doubt: A bird struck the airplane during that last flight.

Technician Gutnik could sense the anxiety building up in his heart. After all, in the last 2 days the missile carrier could have been launched on a flying assignment without forewarning--this did happen on and off. What was the guarantee that nothing would have happened to it while in flight? Thus it turned out that he, the technician, might have become responsible for a flying accident due to his carelessness.

"What's next, what should I do?" the officer thought in torment. Of course, he had to immediately report the incident to the squadron deputy commander for the air

engineering service. But he stopped himself short: "But nothing happened--the pilot had not noticed any deviations in the engine's work." But this was poor consolation.

Having sat indecisively for a few minutes, the officer finally reasoned that reporting his unforgivable carelessness to the chief had to be the first step in admitting his guilt.

The aircraft was handed over to the technical maintenance unit, where the engine was meticulously inspected. In the final analysis, everything was well with the equipment. It was then that doubt stirred in Gutnik: "Could it be that I'm making trouble for myself needlessly, could it be that I shouldn't have reported this?"

Soon after the incident the squadron commander said to him:

"It has been decided to examine your transgression at an officer meeting."

These words lashed painfully. After all, nothing happened with the airplane, and now see how things are turning out. Is this really just? During all the time that he, Gutnik, had served in the regiment, he never heard a bad word from anyone. But make one mistake, and right away it's your head. Is that a little much?

Senior Lieutenant of Technical Service M. Shkola asked to speak first when the officer meeting began. No, he did not condemn his comrade's transgression. Instead, he defended him: The man made a mistake, and who doesn't? All the more so he was a good specialist, which he had demonstrated in his work many times. Another officer began his speech in about the same spirit. The way he told it, it was the bird that struck the air intake and not the technician that was at fault. Gutnik mentally thanked his colleagues for their kind support. His admission of the guilt which obsessed him before faded somewhere into the background. Then the commander rose from his seat:

"Some of you have tried to condone Officer Gutnik's carelessness," he began quietly but stiffly. "You've made it sound like he's not guilty of anything...."

The commander spoke not only of the possible consequences of the technician's carelessness--the people in the auditorium were well aware of what had happened, but also of the causes of the incident itself. He spoke of the fact that some time ago Gutnik had weakened his demands upon himself, and had diminished his commitment to his work. The performance of his duties was somewhat lax. Thus it turns out that he cares not for an officer's honor, for the honor of the military collective.

It was perhaps only now that Gutnik really began to feel the weight of his guilt, and sense the unpersuasiveness of the arguments ventured by comrades attempting to take up his defense. Step by step he pondered his entire career. And days on which he did not look far enough or simply omitted steps in servicing an airplane came to his mind. He knew that he could and should do everything in the best way possible. He remembered days when he would come to his lessons not with textbooks but with a new detective novel, which he would read in secret. And there were many times when he passed some of his duties and troubles to the mechanic, trusting in his experience and knowledge.



The commander and fellow servicemen who spoke subsequently talked about this in all frankness. But their words also bore the confidence that he, Gutnik, would be able to correct his shortcomings.

The flying went on as it did before. Deafening the countryside with the whine of jet engines, the winged craft rose into the air. And the fighter bomber which Officer Gutnik had previously prepared for flight took to the sky as well. Only now the craft was being serviced by another technician. Other specialists escorted its flight into the stratosphere. Why? Because Gutnik had been temporarily relieved from his duties as a technician, and he was now working in the technical maintenance unit, assisting in the performance of repairs. He attacked his new work with zeal. He wanted to distract his mind from his troubles, to forget himself in his work.

Viktor Gutnik came to view his new place in the officer collective in a different way. His bitter lesson was firmly imprinted in his memory. The words of Major V. Trubitsin--the same pilot who had piloted the missile carrier in those former times--impressed themselves in his consciousness as a good rule to live by: "It is within your power to regain your lost authority."

Officer Gutnik cleared his good name. Through faultless labor and a conscientious attitude toward his work he earned the previous trust of the collective.

A month later he was put back on flight support. One can imagine the ecstasy with which he worked on that day! Preparing a missile carrier for flight, he performed the most mundane operations, but his heart sang.

Quite recently Viktor Gutnik left for a new place of service. He was given a warm send-off. I met Viktor Gutnik at the airfield a few days before his departure. He was attentively and lovingly inspecting all machine units of the warplane, preparing it for surrender to another specialist. It was at this time that he told me the instructive story.

"Is this worth writing about?" he repeated my question. "Perhaps so, so that others would not repeat my mistake."

#### Commander-Subordinate Interrelationships Discussed

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jan 82 p 2

[Article by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Major S. Levitskiy: "'Aim your Sights Higher!'" ]

[Text] I met Military Pilot 1st Class Guards Captain Vyacheslav Kolpakov for the first time at the peak of the flying schedule. Thickset in his blue jacket which closely hugged his broad shoulders, he enthusiastically related his impressions of combat in the stratosphere. The "enemy" maneuvered in course and altitude. Nevertheless Kolpakov was able to make a swift and accurate attack. But then the discussion turned to the concerns of a commander. The gray eyes beneath the dark brows grew stern. Yes, it was interesting and difficult to work with people.

Just at that moment a report came in from the command post--Guards Senior Lieutenant Zh. Sandybayev performed excellently in the air. "He scored a five!" Kolpakov joyously smiled. But things did not fall together right away for this pilot. True, at first it did not cause Kolpakov any special concern. He studied diligently and persistently. And whenever he made mistakes in flight, the commander felt them to be the usual growing pains. But time passed, and Sandybayev never made any noticeable progress for the better. It was then that the flight commander began doubting his capabilities.

And so another interview with the pilot. No, he loved his work. He was ready to work and work hard. The commander became thoughtful: Was he perhaps a little hasty in his evaluations and conclusions?

Next time he took off together with Sandybayev. As before, the pilot made mistakes. After they landed he hung his head in anticipation of the instructor's remarks. What could Kolpakov say? Should he mention the deviations from the required angle of banking turns? Should he recommend a textbook or classroom work? Things like these had been tried before. And still the commander's list of unfavorable observations grew. Kolpakov now understood the reasons behind each mistake deeper. But would it make any sense, he thought, to enter into lengthy explanations without first systematizing and thinking about these causes? Therefore he only said: "Don't worry. You'll make it."

The commander subsequently sorted through the different ways he could work with the pilot in his mind many times. He mentally placed himself in his shoes. And so he deliberated: One of the variants would be beyond Sandybayev's capabilities while another, a simpler one might take away too much of his time. Sometimes during lunch Kolpakov would suddenly drop his spoon, place his notebook on his knee, and draw sketches and make calculations. It was in this way that Kolpakov soon completed a visual aid tailored especially for Sandybayev. Using it, the pilot was able to study the methods of calculating courses and turn angles more easily.

Then followed the check flights, and Sandybayev's first successes. Kolpakov made sure to say something good about his progress when summarizing the results of the socialist competition. He could see the pilot's pride building.

It is not very easy to sense the subtle individuality of a subordinate or to understand the features of his character and his interests. A young commander, with all the energy inherent to him, wishes to see the results of his work as quickly as possible. "Here is a lesson I once learned," Kolpakov narrated. Once he took off on a paired sortie together with Guards Senior Lieutenant A. Lopatin. Everything went normally during the flight. But had not the flight commander intervened in time during landing, the fighter would probably have run off the end of the runway. "I never expected this from you," Kolpakov scolded Lopatin in his irritation. "Take some time to think about what you're doing."

But nothing came of this "thinking." Lopatin was unable to find the reasons for his mistakes. Nor did he turn to anyone for help. Kolpakov noticed the pilot's confusion, and he could sense the cooling of his relationship with Lopatin, and the latter's estrangement.

The squadron political worker, Guards Captain V. Krinitsyn found the flight commander in the classroom in a no better mood. Sensing what was wrong, he simply asked: "Lopatin?" Kolpakov nodded. "He has a difficult character," Krinitsyn thought aloud, "he's hot tempered."

It was then that Kolpakov's memory returned him to an incident that had made a deep impression on his soul. It was after graduating from the military aviation school, when he started confidently flying a powerful needle-nosed fighter in a combat regiment. But suddenly things began to go wrong. He found that no matter what he did, he always leveled off for landing too high. Kolpakov prepared for flying carefully, but the mistake kept happening. Major V. Gurkin took on the job of working it out with him. Flying with the major, Kolpakov repeated his mistake again. Kolpakov's legs felt shaky as he stepped down from the airplane to the concrete. He looked at the instructor, and he was surprised to see Gurkin smiling. "You'll make a good fighter pilot yet," he said confidently to Kolpakov. "Keep your sights higher! I mean that literally. Your problem is that you've been tilting your head a little while landing, and this is why the airplane's altitude always seems normal to you."

Kolpakov now remembered that curious incident in a new light. Of course, any other competent instructor could have figured out the reason behind his "strange" mistake. But Gurkin was able to find the right approach toward this young pilot, teaching him without breaking his spirit. And now Lopatin was in Kolpakov's position. Was this not the time for a sensitive and understanding commander?

That day in the classroom Kolpakov did not go into detail with Krinitsyn on how he intended to deal with Lopatin. And Krinitsyn did not bring up the question either, noticing that a solution seemed to be gelling in Kolpakov's mind. It was not the simplest solution. Kolpakov apologized to Lopatin for his roughness. He then suggested to the pilot that they work together to determine why he was making mistakes. They spent a long time together that day in the classroom. They accompanied each other home as well, continuing their discussion enthusiastically.

While these actions seem simple and matter-of-fact, they took considerable spiritual effort on the part of Kolpakov. He had to be able to "see the man." He had to understand that tactfulness could never be substituted by impatience and that real assistance could not be substituted by hasty advice.

The official and party concerns of a commander include more than just the indoctrination and training of pilots. He must have a good awareness of the moral and business qualities of all who support flying by their difficult work on the ground. This knowledge also came to the aid of the commander in his search for solutions to difficult training problems.

Once aircraft technician Guards Lieutenant of Technical Service V. Samsonov showed up for flying with his head hung low. Preparing a fighter, he "forgot" to remove a safety from the catapult mechanism. The chief of the flight's technical maintenance unit, Guards Captain of Technical Service V. Braslavskiy noticed this while checking on Samsonov's work. He reported the incident to Kolpakov. Nevertheless the commander did not leap to conclusions. First of all he asked Braslavskiy why



the officer made the mistake. "I was told that there was another wild party last night at the officer's residence hall," he explained with some uncertainty. "Why don't you go there and find out what sort of conditions your subordinate is living in, what his interests are, and what his friends are like?" Kolpakov advised. He believed that as a result Braslavskiy would be able to work out the entire problem himself and have a positive influence on Samsonov. At this moment the commander was thinking about something else: This was not the first time he had to offer such recommendations. Sometimes it happened that he was able to work on the training of some officer or soldier personally. But he did not always have time to work thoroughly with each one.

Kolpakov shared his doubts with the squadron commander, Guards Lieutenant Colonel A. Ometov. The latter began his response in a round-about way: "We have good specialists in the flight. The officers are technically competent. Naturally, you wouldn't think of substituting for them at their workplaces, would you?" Then the discussion turned to an officer's skill as a teacher, to the fact that he must teach the immediate supervisors of the warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers.

That same evening Kolpakov came across Braslavskiy on one of the paths of the post. Braslavskiy was just returning from the residence hall in which Samsonov lived. He spoke with some concern: "They're young people, but they seem to have nothing to do in their free time." "How could that be?" Kolpakov asked. What about movies? What about dances? After all, the officers must have certain interests. Would Braslavskiy be able to find things to do within the capabilities and interests of each? Could he perhaps organize a debate. Or a quiz? Does he necessarily have to limit his efforts to the facilities afforded by the Officers' Club?

Finding the unmarked trails to the hearts of people and leading subordinates to new successes in combat training is always a difficult and creative thing. And so it was now. After the flying, Ometov approached Kolpakov: "Nazarenko will be returning tomorrow." The flight commander had already given this some thought. Guards Senior Lieutenant Ye. Nazarenko had returned to the garrison from sick leave. Naturally he had fallen behind his comrades in his flight training. How will he take to catching up, what will his mood be? Kolpakov shared these thoughts with Ometov, mentioning that he had decided to visit Nazarenko at home that day, and to talk with him. Ometov nodded his head in agreement--their opinions coincided.

One had to see how happy Nazarenko was to see the commander. Kolpakov brought him up to date on the collective's affairs, and he added: "Everyone's happy that you've recovered, and they're all waiting for you." "But our flight is now the best in the regiment," Nazarenko said with a troubled tone. "How can I possibly fit in now?" "Raise your sights higher!" Kolpakov retorted without thinking. He immediately felt that his remark was not conducive to intimate conversation. Thus he went on to explain: "Don't worry, you'll be able to work yourself in quickly." But he did not need to go on: He could see that Nazarenko understood him well.



## International Helicopter Competition Discussed

Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 29 Dec 81 p 4

[Article by G. Tsepulin: "Counter to the Current"]

[Text] Peaceful Skies

Captain Volodin loved the sky. The roar of the engine could not prevent him from sensing the stillness of the vast expanses of blue. He played in the sky like a child splashing in the waves at the seashore. The words "training flight" had the ring of a holiday on that day in 1945. He celebrated 9 May in the sky above Austria.

This was the most carefree flight in his life. Volodin's wife Mariya--Mariya the armorer they called her in the regiment--could hear her husband's singing over the radio. For 3 years now, several times a day she watched him fly away, and sitting by the regimental loudspeaker she listened with anxiety to the noise and thunder of aerial combat. The loudspeaker would unexpectedly fall silent, the voices and shots would fade away, and there would be 15 minutes of silence, the 15 minutes in which the airplanes made their return flight. This was a time of uncertainty. Mariya became keen-eyed during the war, and wrinkles appeared early around her eyes due to her constant squinting.

Our airplanes appeared in the sky like mosquitoes: "One, two...five! They all made it! They're all flying together." These were happy minutes. This was a happy day.

But this day it was a peaceful training flight. Volodin recalled his native Krasnovodsk. He was only 24 years old by the way. He would submit a request to remain in military aviation.

The sky was bluer than blue. In this mood he could not keep himself from singing, and recalling a simple, unpretentious but favorite song. Masha listened to her husband's soft baritone, and the static did not diminish her delight in his song.

Suddenly she saw a high-flying airplane dive.

"Fascists!" Masha cried.

"Tolya, check your rear! You've got an American on your tail," Mariya could hear the calm voice of Skorobogatov, the squadron commander. "Do a corkscrew!"

Volodin's regiment prided itself in the "corkscrew." How many times it saved pilots from the enemy, setting up the opponent's airplanes for the kill. It was always recommended to young pilots arriving at the unit to master this air maneuver.

The maneuver placed the fascist within range when the latter, anticipating victory, accelerated his aircraft to the maximum. At the moment his pursuer reached the peak of his effort, Volodin rolled his airplane on its left wing. From this banking turn he rolled the airplane over on its back, and continuing his roll,

he turned sharply to the side so as to complete a half circle, attain the opponent's tail and strike without missing. This is what he did now, selecting a convenient position for the attack. The American searched the sky in dismay, wondering where he went. Behind him, Volodin laughed: "That's no way to pay a social call!"

A second "Cobra" flew up to him, and the pilot jerked up his thumb: "O.K.!"

"Thanks!" Volodin signaled with his hand. "Have a good trip!"

The next day the Americans flew over once again. They rushed back and forth over the airfield. They climbed straight up and then hurled to the ground, leveling off at the last minute.

They wanted to show off, to demonstrate that they were aces too, and that they could contend with the Russians. But our boys were in no mood for games. They were tired of war. Of course, they could have complained to the division about the Americans. But they decided not to trouble the leaders. They hatched a plot, and soon after breakfast they took off in a group of five. Just before reaching their neighbor's airfield they rolled over on their backs and flew at ground level over the astonished Americans, just barely clearing the roofs of the barracks. They turned in unison, climbed steeply, and then dived. The five airplanes completed their maneuver as if they were all under the control of a single pilot. Coming out of their dive they raised dust on the ground. Then they performed a Nesterov loop as they climbed, and on their last turn they peeled off away from the airfield, never breaking their tight formation.

The Americans did not appear in the sky again. But a few days later they did drive over to the regiment in a jeep. They were met in Russian style, enthusiastically.

#### "Written Off"

Pilots never part with the sky voluntarily. But the time inevitably comes when they must gradually begin preparing themselves to meet the sentence of the physicians with some sense of honor. Volodin heard this sentence when he was 25 years old: "Written off!"

His lungs let him down. The physicians soothed the pilot with promises, and they advised him to go home, to Turkmenia.

He had to begin life all over again. But how? He did not know anything but flying.

The Caspian Sea, polished by the sun, languished by the shore in anticipation of a gentle breeze. Softly whistling, sand stirred on the dune tops. An old Turkmen with a name that sounds harsh to the Russian ear--Taganklych--twirled a long stick in his hands and spoke slowly:

"Your native land will heal you, and you will once again take to the skies, my son!"

But the hunter Taganklych, an old family friend, said nothing specific about work. He needed time to think things out.

One day Taganklych took Tolya hunting. While they stalked he distracted him with hunting stories, and suddenly he began talking about work:

"Go ahead and indulge yourself a little. Relax, go ahead and retreat a little, but keep you goal in sight! It came to my mind that there is a small airfield in the south of the republic, belonging to the border troops. Go there. Help others, teach them."

"But how can I teach someone to swim without getting wet?" Volodin sadly retorted, but then he immediately regained his composure. "Sure, I guess I'll go find this airfield. If they could just give me work on the ground next to airplanes!"

"Write me, my son, when you once again cross that border between earth and sky!" Taganklych smiled.

### The Border

The commander was delighted on seeing the captain before him. But when he learned that this pilot blacks out when he climbs, and that his lungs could burst from the slightest G-force, he lowered his eyes, but then he immediately regained his control: "There isn't much here to fly in at the moment. We can't fly if there's nothing to fly! Let me send you to Romanov the blacksmith. He needs an apprentice, a student."

Volodin did not fly the first airplane they repaired. The day prior to the flight he went to the medical commission. "Too early!" the doctors said. But Volodin did not grow resentful, or at least that was the appearance he gave. Seeing his comrade flying was joy enough for him. No one noticed him stealing a quick moment to caress the airplane on its return from the sky.

Volodin made many trips to the medical commission.

He felt that he was growing stronger beneath the hot desert sun, and the heaviness in his chest gradually faded away.

Pavlushka, a young boy from a factory-plant school, now did the light work. The doctors gave Volodin permission to use heavier tools.

"You'll soon fly away, my pigeon," the blacksmith encouraged him. "Border service should be to your liking. The war has ended for everyone, but for us it is always war! Your fighting spirit will be useful here."

The border troops were equipped with the sky sloth, the PO-2. It couldn't get over a hundred and ten. This was a trainer for school cadets. It was a woman's bomber. If I'm to get back into the sky, it should be to fly, and not to swim, to chew sunflower seeds, Volodin thought. But the blacksmith's words pushed him toward a decision.

Volodin was accepted into border aviation. A few nights later a message came in that the state border had been violated. Navigator Zhora Krupa quickly plotted

the route on a map and calculated his take-off time in such a way that he would be in the search area at sunrise. He was joined by a second crew led by Petr Brusnikin. They sat down, thought things over, and exchanged their opinions about the possible routes the border violators could take in our rear. They argued about what to do, but they finally arrived at a unanimous opinion: If they were so stubborn in their intent to cross the dessert, they must have a clear idea of where the wells are: No one is going to drag a water tank around the desert. They also knew that Turkmens dug their wells along routes leading from south to north.

They arrived over the place where the border had been crossed. The frontier detachment indicated the direction of the breakthrough and estimated how many kilometers could have been traveled in the intervening time.

It is difficult to fly over sand because there are no reference points, but there are advantages nonetheless: The tracks of even small animals are easily seen. A snake cannot crawl by without a trace. Soon Volodin discovered the tracks of the enemy. He advised Brusnikin to drop lower while he himself flew at 300 meters, making it possible for the navigator to plot their route and determine their location. About 50 kilometers from the state border the tracks disappeared. Volodin climbed slightly to make a turn when Zhora noted a bush in the distance.

"We better check that bush out on the ground!"

Brusnikin settled the craft down on hardpan. The pilots took down the machinegun and prepared their personal weapons. Volodin marked the location of the bush with a flare and began circling over it, covering his comrade. The violators surrendered.

"Look, commander, they've put their hands up! Let's land and help Brusnikin pack away the uninvited guests."

The enemy never tired of various tricks. During one border penetration the frontier guards lost sight of tracks that led toward our rear. The violators could not be found along the well route. Fuel was running low, and it was time to go home. Volodin turned the airplane and assumed a homeward course. Suddenly he remembered seeing two camels at one point during his flight, moving persistently northward. Usually in September they preferred to move south. "And why two of them? Why so far away from any settlements? Are they lost? They need to be checked out!"

Approaching his target he dived sharply toward the animals, leveling off right at ground level. This unnerved the violator, who dove out from beneath the camel and covered his head with his arms.

Anatoliy Ivanovich Volodin mastered the wags of the frontier troops down to the last detail, creatively. Good service is just as noticeable as bad service. He flew as a squadron commander in the Baltic. In the Far East he headed a separate air unit. In the south he did the same, but on a higher level. He flew all of his life without accident. A commander, a teacher and a master--this is how junior officers referred to him.



### Aboard a Helicopter

Border aviation began to be equipped with helicopters. To a fighter pilot who had ended the war aboard swift LA-7's the helicopter represented an entirely new form of flying.

What was he to do? Anatoliy Ivanovich came to a decision: Learn! Once again he went counter to the current of the unexpected turns in his life.

Zerin, a young instructor, was taken aback on seeing before him a colonel, a Hero of the Soviet Union. The latter, meanwhile, reported calmly according to the regulations that he was placing himself at the complete disposal of the lieutenant, and winking, he added with a fatherly tone:

"If you want to make a top class helicopter pilot out of me, teach me without paying any attention to my shoulderboards. Be as hard with me as you would with a cadet. And even harder!"

Anatoliy Ivanovich Volodin quickly grasped the advantages the helicopter offered to the border troops. And while some deliberated, recalling that a chicken is not a bird and that a helicopter is not an airplane, Volodin successfully mastered the new craft. General Anatoliy Ivanovich Volodin is still serving in aviation, as he did before. He earned one more combat order in peacetime--the Red Banner.

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## DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

### NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT IN MILITARY-RELATED SPORTS PROGRAMS NOTED

Moscow ZA RULEM in Russian No 1, Jan 82 (signed to press 27 Nov 81) pp 2-3

[Article by V. D. Sysoyev: "Sports for the People"]

[Text] ...Increase attention to technical and applied military sports, especially automobile, motorcycle, parachute and shooting sport.

From CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers Decree "On a Further Upsurge in the Mass Nature of Physical Culture and Sport."

The Soviet people are enthusiastically implementing resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, which determined the main route for building communism in the 1980's.

Party plans set aside a major place for the further development of physical culture and sport. As a result of a stable growth of the Soviet Union's economy and culture and fundamental resolution of basic social problems, our country has performed considerable work to develop mass physical culture and sport, to increase athletes' proficiency and to expand international sports ties. USSR citizens' activities in physical culture and sports are guaranteed by the Basic Law, the Constitution. Each year the Soviet state allocates vast funds and physical-technical resources for these purposes. The scale of the physical culture and sports movement is one of the important achievements of socialism. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, however, "sports for the majority of people still remain only a spectacle. This situation must be corrected. Physical culture must be a part of the daily life of broad layers of the population and children in particular."

A CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers decree adopted in September 1981 entitled "On a Further Upsurge in the Mass Nature of Physical Culture and Sports" is aimed wholly at carrying out this congress guideline. This decree outlines an entire program of action for the people's health and introduction of physical culture and sports into the daily routine of Soviet citizens. It points out that under conditions of developed socialism physical culture must contribute comprehensively to a growth in national economic and defense potential and a satisfaction of Soviet citizens' spiritual needs, and it must be an effective means for the comprehensive, harmonious development of the

individual and development of an active position in life. The decree contains extremely precise wording of the chief task of our physical culture movement and of the entire physical indoctrination system. Its meaning is a comprehensive contribution to strengthening the health of Soviet citizens, increasing their working capacity and labor productivity, increasing their readiness to defend the Motherland and the achievements of socialism, developing high moral qualities, spirit, strength and endurance, and bringing up a healthy and buoyant growing generation.

In the interests of accomplishing this task most successfully, the decree obligated the Communist Party central committees of union republics and party kraykoms, obkoms, okrug committees, gorkoms and raykoms to reinforce party leadership of the physical culture movement; to raise the responsibility of soviet, trade union, Komsomol, sports and economic entities and committees of DOSAAF for the truly massive development of physical culture and sports; and to improve the coordination of their work in training and retraining cadres, in the construction and effective use of athletic facilities, in the production of athletic goods and equipment, and in conducting mass sports activities. Beginning with this year, USSR Gosplan will include the main indicators of development of physical culture and sports in drafts of state plans and the USSR TsSU [Central Statistical Administration] will take account of results of their accomplishment in state statistical reporting. Specific requirements also are advanced for soviet entities, trade unions, the Komsomol and appropriate ministries and departments. Rights and obligations of the All-Union Sports Committee and its local entities are clearly defined. The Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Armed Forces is given a major role in implementing the outlined program.

It is noteworthy that all these requirements and obligations of all organizations and establishments are permeated by a single line--a line aimed at a comprehensive upsurge in the mass nature of physical culture and sports and at their active introduction into our people's daily lives so that in the next few years it will be a daily need of every Soviet citizen, especially children and the youth, to engage in physical exercises, sports and tourism.

The decree points out that the shortest path to achieving this goal is by involving the population in physical culture and sports activities directly at enterprises, kolkhozes, establishments, educational institutions and at places of residence. Therefore all organizations and departments involved in the development of physical culture and sports, and above all of course, DOSAAF sports organizations and committees, must focus their main efforts and means in this direction.

In recent years Defense Society organizations responsible for the development of technical and applied military sports have achieved some success in this matter.

The number of workers, especially among the youth, who regularly engage in these kinds of sports has risen noticeably in all republics and oblasts of the country as a result of a strengthening of the physical-technical facilities of shooting, underwater, parachute, motorcycle, automobile, motor boat, aviation

and radio sports, applied military combined games, and sports model building; an expansion in the network of technical sports clubs and children's-youth technical sports schools; and an improvement in the training and coaching process. The number of ranking athletes and masters of sport is growing from year to year. The international prestige of our athletes is rising. Soviet pilots and parachutists, masters of ice motor racing and motorcycle soccer players, underwater swimmers and model builders, shooters and radio operators are renowned as the strongest in the world and in Europe. Our motocross, rally and cart racers have many victories in world championships and competition for friendship cups of socialist countries.

But the mass level reached in technical sports in an age of motors, the atom, electronics and broad introduction of various machines and devices into all sectors of the national economy and the lives of Soviet citizens cannot be considered satisfactory.

Of course many sports cultivated by DOSAAF cannot be as massive as, for example, track and field or gymnastics. But unfortunately shooting sport, applied military combined games and sports model building, which do not take a back seat to them in accessibility, take in a very narrow range of people in many places and in some areas are doomed entirely to oblivion. Every third DOSAAF primary organization still is not engaged in sports work. Far from all opportunities have been exhausted in raising the mass nature of automobile and motorcycle sports.

There are now eight million Soviet families in the country with automobiles and their number is steadily rising. There are 13 million who own motorcycles. To this must be added the army of professional drivers--representatives of the largest working trade, military drivers and militia workers--and it turns out that an appreciable part of the adult population in the country is linked in the closest manner with motorized equipment. The number of persons engaged in automobile sports--1,354,000--and the 986,000 in motorcycle sports can be considered more than modest against this background.

The trouble here lies in the fact that many DOSAAF committees focus primary attention on training composite teams and on the teams' participation in all-union and republic competitions and assemblies, for which the primary funds are spent, to the detriment of the mass development of sports among the population.

It also is very troubling that physical preparedness of some predraft-age youth does not fully meet the requirements placed on a young person by service in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces, and that passing the norms of the GTO [Ready for Labor and Defense] complex in technical and automobile schools and technical sports clubs at times is done in a formal manner and preparation of ranking athletes among cadets is done with great deviations from established procedures.

All this obligates DOSAAF committees and organizations to make a radical change in the approach to sports work and see to it that sports become a daily activity for the majority of the Society's members, and the youth above



all. The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee together with other organizations has been tasked with increasing attention to technical and applied military sports, especially automobile, motorcycle, parachute and shooting sport, and to an improvement in physical preparation of predraft and draft-age youth; and not to allow formalism in this matter.

With consideration of these demands it obviously is advisable for the Society's committees and its training and sports organizations to draw up complete plans for an upsurge in the mass nature of sports which would reflect concrete measures for regulating the conduct of competitions and assemblies, the economic expenditure of funds for these purposes, the training of coaches, instructors and judges, strengthening of the physical technical facilities, their more effective use, and a strengthening of ties with the Komsomol, trade unions, sports organizations and other organizations.

The CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers decree makes it mandatory to conduct sports activities in labor collectives and educational institutions and in cities and rayons only in time off from work and studies, and to hold oblast and kray competitions usually on Saturdays and Sundays. DOSAAF committees must follow these requirements firmly and arrange sports work so as not to allow workers to be diverted from production.

An expansion of the most accessible kinds of competitions intended for rank-and-file automobile and motorcycle drivers also must hold a noticeable place in these plans. For example, this can be various types of combined games, one-day motorcycle races, rallies on short courses, and trials. Experience in conducting these and a number of other simple competitions requiring no special expenditures has been gained in the Baltic republics and in the Urals. Fuller use must be made of the capabilities of automobile model building to draw DOSAAF members into sports activities. It would be proper for every automobile school to have a section for automobile model building along with sections of automobile and motorcycle sports.

In drawing up programs for competitions one must not forget questions of fuel economy and equipment upkeep. The time has come to revise conditions for holding some competitions protracted in time and reject a practice where crews who clearly are not ready for such serious starts ride thousands of kilometers in state vehicles for national rally championships.

Contests for thrifty driving should be in the arsenal of organizers of sports activities. By the way, many of them were held at the dawn of our automobile sport as well as in postwar years. It would appear worthwhile to revive not only useful starts for economy, but also the hill ascent, slalom and others, now almost forgotten, which always attracted a large number of participants.

It also is very useful to turn to experience of our friends from socialist countries, such as the GDR's General Motorcycle Sport League, which annually organizes over 1,500 mass competitions. These are contests for motorcyclists on very basic routes present in each rayon and city, which include the slalom, maneuvering and negotiation of various simple obstacles. Anyone who wishes may go to the starting line of such competitions. Something similar also is

provided for automobile drivers. Drivers' ability to park, brake and slalom is tested in mass competitions under the motto "Everyone can participate." Much that is useful in this sense also can be drawn from the experience of, defense sports organizations of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria.

DOSAAF committees have sufficient capabilities to achieve an upsurge in the mass nature of automobile and motorcycle sport in the near future. They have a network of technical sports clubs and sports sections and circles in cities, rayons, automobile schools and major primary organizations.

Voluntary sports societies also are called upon to play an incomparably greater role than before in building up the tempos of mass sports work. The decree made it mandatory to consider indicators in applied and technical military sports in evaluating their work. This in turn requires reinforcement of contacts between the DSO [voluntary sports societies] and DOSAAF committees, which not only must take advantage of the capabilities of sports societies, but assist them as well. The question above all is about such DSO's as "Spartak," which brings together drivers of motor transport enterprises, "Dinamo," which takes in militia workers, the "Labor Reserves," and Army sports clubs. One would like to see closer coordination in sports work with societies of amateur automobile and motorcycle drivers in republics and with AUCCTU councils for tourism and excursions.

An intensification of party and state leadership of physical culture and sports in the country should be supplemented with a further development of volunteerism. In this connection DOSAAF is obligated to rely more on the sports aktiv, expand it in every possible way and give it constant attention. The sports public has the right to expect useful initiatives aimed at a comprehensive expansion in the framework of automobile and motorcycle sport and the inclusion of millions of people in their activities on the part of federations of automobile, motorcycle and automobile model building sports, which unite authoritative and knowledgeable specialists.

We have great reserves in mass sports. They lie in the country's motor transport enterprises where millions of drivers work, in Sel'khoztekhnika, in departmental avtobazas, and at automobile and motorcycle plants. Vocational-technical schools, tekhnikums and schools of general education deserve special attention in this respect inasmuch as activities in automobile and motorcycle sports are of great importance for young people preparing for service in the Soviet Army.

It must be regretted that children and teenagers are being brought into automobile and motorcycle sport very timidly. Schoolchildren have an extremely great attraction to it, as attested by the popularity of the "Cart Racing Club," "Pionerskaya Pravda," and contests for young drivers for the ZA RULEM prizes. But this clearly is insufficient. It probably is not difficult to set up children's courses for contests on motor bikes and mopeds or even, as done in a number of countries, organize competitions on crosscountry micro-motorcycles produced especially for children, not to mention open mass starts for children who enjoy automobile model building.

In directing efforts at organizing mass sports work we can in no way relax attention to the preparation of high ranking athletes or a sports reserve or to improving ideological indoctrination work in composite teams and sports schools in order to indoctrinate the youth in a spirit of dedication to the cause of communism and readiness to struggle for victory in the world arena.

Late last year the USSR DOSAAF CC Plenum discussed the Defense Society's tasks stemming from the CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers Decree "On a Further Upsurge in the Mass Nature of Physical Culture and Sport" and outlined a concrete program of action, including for the development of automobile and motorcycle sport and automobile model building.

It is the duty of all DOSAAF committees and organizations to make a tangible contribution to this major nationwide cause and see to it that physical culture and sports are fully placed at the service of labor and defense and perform tasks of communist indoctrination.

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## MILITARY SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES

### SCIENTIFIC POTENTIAL OF MILITARY ACADEMIES

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Nov 81 p 2

[Article by Engr-Lt Gen A. Solodov, deputy chief for training and science, F. E. Dzhherzhinskiy Military Academy, doctor of technical sciences, professor, and honored scientist and technician: "The Principal Components of the Scientific Potential of a Military Academy"]

[Text] One of the requirements of the 26th CPSU Congress is to increase the effective use of the research potential at higher educational institutions. This requirement of the congress for a party forum also applies fully to military schools, particularly the academies. "The further enhancement of the military might of the Armed Forces," Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, minister of defense, has emphasized, "requires from the commanders of the military schools and the professors and instructors the continuous improvement of the organization of the training and indoctrination of students and cadets, and the confident inclusion of those new techniques in the training that are the byproducts of military thought and the training experience of the military forces, and which will satisfy the needs of the army and navy to a maximum extent."

Generally, this requirement is being fulfilled. A large number of graduates of the military academies enter the ranks of the forces each year. The graduates are officers who are wholeheartedly devoted to the homeland, are politically mature, and possess a solid store of military and technical knowledge. However, science and technology develop unrelentingly, which means that the armed forces are supplied with ever more advanced military systems, complexes, and weapons. Some specialists unfortunately fail to keep pace with the innovations. Additionally, it is clear that today's graduate must possess a definite "reserve of strength" for the future, a store of theoretical knowledge, and practical and research skills, which allow him continually, without the aid of "stationary" retraining, to independently master new technology. Briefly stated, individuals are needed who can use their academic knowledge as a base on which to continually elevate their qualifications, while keeping up with the times.

It is clear that the formation of the qualities that have been discussed cannot be achieved solely through the mastering of an academic program. Individuals cannot afford to stop studying; or to put it more precisely, the training of an officer, regardless of whether he is a military commander or an engineer, should not be restricted. There must be a deeper more concrete interaction with science. This



primarily means that students must be guided into active participation in that military scientific work which contributes to the deepening of knowledge and to developing of the skills necessary for the conduct of experimental and theoretical studies.

By improving the organization of scientific research in higher educational institutions, we are solving a common problem of a dual nature: The enhancement of the quality of the training of graduates and the expansion of individual contributions to the upgrading of military technology and weaponry and the conditions for their use and combat application, as well as contributions to the search for the most effective methods for waging combat.

In other words, a military academy can and should influence scientific and technical progress in the armed forces not only through its graduates, but also indirectly through the findings from its laboratories and research departments. Indeed, the potential resources are enormous. The volume of scientific studies and research and development work can be markedly increased while more extensively increasing the participation of instructors, students, and graduates.

We are faced with outstanding opportunities. At the least, it is necessary to use the accumulated creative skills with greater effectiveness and to expand the "coefficient of participation" of the academies in the solution of practical problems of military training. What are some of the problems? How do you define the fulcrum of scientific potential? What are the principal components? How can we use them most effectively? The decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers "On Increasing the Effectiveness of Scientific Research in Higher Educational Institutions" guides the scientific resources of these institutions toward the solution of these problems.

Scientific research chiefly needs improvements in planning. The planning must be carried on with the aim of the timely provision of a broad range of studies, a proper consideration of fundamental and applied subjects, a rapid rate of development of the advanced sectors of knowledge, and an accelerated movement in new directions.

The system of scientific research within the academies now, more than ever in the past, must be more flexible and must react to the practical needs of the armed forces, particularly during the training of cadres. It is crucial to provide for "professional mobility" -- the capacity to rapidly expand the range of research and to master related disciplines. This naturally requires the energetic application of the strengths and resources of science itself.

Command elements, the staffs of professors and instructors, the political departments, and party organizations of the academies are showing concern for the problems of scientific research. Year in and year out the time that it takes to introduce new advances is diminishing, the practical directivity of scientific research is improving. The uninterrupted growth in the number of author's certificates for inventions and the applications for these certificates is an indication of the quality of the research. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that, notwithstanding the total volume of scientific research, the level and depth of some of the studies are low, particularly those that are being done by the collectives of

young researchers. This situation results from inadequate skills and occasionally from a lack of awareness of the latest methods of research such as modeling, statistical analysis of test results, algorithms, and computer programming.

We are definitely striving to enhance the level of training of the young researchers with the objective of overcoming these shortcomings. This task is being carried out at many of our research departments. For example, Col-Engr Professor V. Brandin and professor A. V. Chechkin are assisting young officers and students to actively work in those areas in which the state of the art makes it feasible to advance rapidly and successfully.

A unique institute for the patent process has been organized and is functioning to increase the competency in patent matters of commanders and participants in scientific research at our academy. Additionally, a special course of lectures on this discipline is given to all students.

Unfortunately, we still encounter examples of unexacting evaluations of the topicality and the scientific, technical, and economic depth of the investigations. At times, selection of the themes is controlled solely by the student based on his own idea of what merits a dissertation and not on the demands of military science. In this matter, it is vital that the responsibilities of the leaders of scientific research subunits and all of the professors and instructors for the topicality of the themes of scientific research be made more specific.

There is little need to demonstrate the importance that a lively association with the forces, an enrichment of science through their experience, and the placement of the practical research done by the forces on a solid scientific base have to the enhancement of the practical purpose of studies and to their rapid completion. This association exists for us in many ways. Within the academy in addition to professional training, other approaches are broadly applied such as trips to units and formations by the full staff of a department to carry out previously coordinated training, practice operations using combat equipment, and so on. As opposed to the individual professional training by instructors, the interaction of the collectives yields a larger return and saves time.

One of the most effective and dynamic methods for the use of the scientific potential of the higher educational institutions for the benefit of the armed forces is the combined development and introduction into combat training of new techniques and facilities for instruction. For example, we have noted that within the armed forces, while much attention is paid to training equipment, sometimes there are efforts to create special devices that in principle simply simulate this or that type of combat equipment. This approach has been justified by its simplicity, but it seriously contracts the potential of training devices. The combined creative scientific research of the military training officers in one of the districts along with scientists at an academy have contributed to finding an exceptionally promising solution to this problem. The collectives led by the generals and officers L. Volkov, T. Seidov, I. Matsulevich, and L. Legalov developed fundamental principles for the construction of more complex designs from which large-scale training devices are being built which more fully respond to present demands, and which are at the same time adequately technological.

I would like to mention still one more matter. The modern military higher educational institution is indeed a unique scientific subunit. As a matter of fact, within this type of scientific research institute you will observe workers right alongside of representatives from the most diverse scientific fields -- philosophers and mathematicians, mechanics and chemists, physicists and electronic technicians. This arrangement opens up a broad avenue for complex, scale-model investigations. It is therefore singularly important to achieve the coordination of efforts between faculties, departments, and laboratories, to avoid redundant research, and to develop cooperation with other military academies and civilian higher educational institutions. All of this will result inevitably in a further growth in the efficiency of scientific research.

The question arises: "By what criteria will such efficiency be evaluated?" Combat training requires the deep-seated and bold investigation by military scientists of new processes and phenomena associated with the organization and conduct of modern warfare and active contributions toward supplying the army and navy with new types of weapons, thoughtful analysis of emerging problems, and responsible recommendations on the best ways of solving them. By taking these varied criteria into consideration we teach and strengthen the young scientists.

An important trend is the programmed special-purpose method of organizing scientific research and development. This approach practically eliminates the problem of the introduction of new developments because the stages of introduction are planned by the program itself.

Experience has shown that the combining of scientific efforts and the discriminating of advanced trends usually enhances and accelerates the findings of investigations.

While we are using the scientific potential of an academy, we are constantly concerned with the further growth of the potential and with the training of cadres of scientific teachers. The efforts of the collective are directed toward the definitiveness of long-range planning of student training, while taking into consideration the actual requirements of the cadres. However, there is still much that should be done to improve the training of the scientists with higher qualifications -- the Ph.D.'s.

The long-standing and renowned tradition of Soviet military science fosters the young researchers with anticipation. The tradition is associated with the names of many of our leading scientists. The instructors and scientists of our day are striving to follow it.

The scientific renown of an academy is an enormous instructive and creative factor. It is also the recognition of the authority of the scientific schools that have been developed by talented military teachers. It is the research and development contribution of the graduates to the strengthening of the defense posture of the country. It is, finally, an entire generation of specialists who are laboring in the armed forces, in scientific centers, and in military training institutions. Our responsibility is to carry on and multiply the glorious traditions and to elevate the role of science still higher.

**END OF**

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